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Abstract
This thesis begins by examining the natural-historical character of Theodor Adorno’s thought
and corpus, 1931–1969, by way of engaging the centennial of the October Russian Revolution.
In the first three chapters we attempt to read Adorno’s corpus as écriture or writing whereupon
unconscious writing of history is transcribed. This literary-driven approach to Adorno’s work
highlights the primacy of history for his thought, whence his late-Marxism issues that culminates
in what we call a politics of experience. Given the historical experience we seek to make legible
heretofore, in chapter four we briefly turn to the hyper-object of ongoing and future
anthropogenic global warming and ask how to narrativize the entangled trajectory of
environmental politics and countenance its outcome in light of the broader history of the Left
stemming from the early 20th century and leading to the present. Throughout we will attend to
themes including the inheritance of the ruin of German Idealism as well as the failures of
Marxism and the Left; the historical compulsion of a post-Hegelian negative dialectics and its
relation to a metacritical engagement with Freudian psychoanalysis; the quandary of lateMarxism’s cul-de-sac and broad turn to aesthetics; the interdisciplinary humanities as a form of
critical object-dependence; the constitutive non-identities of history, experience and criticism;
the citational disclosure of history and its relation to pedagogy and the demos; a poetics of
natural history; and finally, the non-identical claims praxis makes upon theory.

Keywords
Interdisciplinary Humanities, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Russian Revolution, Climate
Change, German Idealism, Negative Dialectics, Natural History.
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Preface
Fittingly belated from the outset, the topical occasions and impetuses for the composition
of this thesis have now receded from the present moment. This thesis was originally written
between September 2016–May 2017 in the form of three discrete but interrelated long-form
essays; however, due to new program length requirements only the first two studies are presented
here, with the first essay subdivided into three parts and the second essay condensed. The
original third essay—a metacritical application of Theodor Adorno’s philosophical aesthetics on
what I have termed contemporary post-Sandy literature, which was written partly on the occasion
of the 2017 Communal Presence: New Narrative Writing Today conference at UC Berkeley and
delivered there on the topical publication of Andrew Durbin’s novel MacArthur Park (2017)—
has been omitted altogether. This final study was intended to finally address the present by
crystallizing the two preceding historico-philosophical essays, and to thereby offer resolution to
the foregoing nonsynchronicity.
Some parts of chapters 1–3 were written and rewritten for the 2017 Legacy of the Russian
Revolution conference held at Chestnut Hill College in Philadelphia. In this conference paper I
make the overarching case that Adorno is to the Russian Revolution what Hegel is to the French
Revolution, the latter as per Rebecca Comay’s Mourning Sickness: Hegel and the French
Revolution (2010). I attempt to capture in this conference paper how Adorno’s corpus may itself
be regarded as a ‘dialectical image’ forged out of the aftermath of 1917.

Introduction
Many of the seed-germs of this thesis were born while studying Adorno’s posthumously
published lectures on Kant and the ‘problems of moral philosophy’ from the 1960s with Susan
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Buck-Morss at the CUNY Graduate Center in February 2015. However, this thesis formally
began as an investigation into the idea of ‘natural history’ in the works of Walter Benjamin,
Theodor Adorno, Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel, a thesis topic originally recommended to
me by Tilottama Rajan. Along the way, more concerns and matters migrated into this already
capacious research topic.
A central underlying impulse of this thesis, one that is perhaps contrarian at first blush, is
to highlight and bring into the fold what might otherwise pass as a blindspot when one operates
within this specific context. Here my concern is not with ‘praxis’ (i.e., practice informed by
critical (non-identical) thinking) as such, but more specifically, with what Adorno in the above
lectures calls the “great inroads into theory” “made” by “praxis.”1 “Praxis” here used, in the
context of the lecture, in reference to what Adorno calls “the celebrated unity of theory and
praxis implied by Marxian theory and then developed above all by Lenin.”2 As we will soon
explore, however, Adorno will want to cleave this “unity” and stress the non-identity of theory
and praxis. As indicated above, in this thesis ‘critical’ will often be equated with ‘non-identical,’
which is intended to mirror the (historical) dialectics at a standstill or antinomies that give rise to
the emergence and apparent necessity of Critical Theory.
Despite the thematic primacy accorded to praxis in this thesis, the idea of natural history
nevertheless serves as a more instructive organizing-principle for grouping the two essays
presented here. With regard to Adorno’s work specifically, which will occupy us chiefly
throughout the thesis, natural history is primarily employed by him as a critical idea, a certain

1

Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy, 4. In a different lecture and context, Adorno will profess, “I believe one
must extrapolate theory from the most advanced tendencies of development, not vice versa” (Adorno, Aesthetics,
84).
2
Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy, 4.
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“dialectical way of seeing.”3 By contrast, Benjamin’s usage of the idea, for instance, is much
more complex and variable, as has been studied at length by Beatrice Hanssen in Benjamin’s
Other History (2000).
In its broadest sweep, the idea of natural history is something of a dialectical image for
Adorno’s philosophy of history and, as I will venture, his entire thought proper. Against a
progressivist view of history of self-overcoming and transformation, Adorno’s corpus captures
both explictly and negatively how decay and disintegration preponderantly inform processes of
history and thought (e.g., intellectual history) itself. Such a view of history, I will argue, emerges
not only out of Adorno’s critical engagements with Benjamin and his metacritiques of Kant,
Hegel, et al.—and much less stems from an imputed ‘negative pathos’ or otherwise—but was
informed, first and foremost, by his own lived, historical and critical experience, 1903–1969. In
my first three chapters I attempt to trace how such lived experience—both peripheral and
immediate—informed Adorno’s thought.
If there is a central motif or thought-figure running throughout Adorno’s work it is the
breakdown of dialectics into unsublatable antinomies. This motif will be explicated most
forcefully in and through what we will call Adorno’s late-Marxism, whose chief cipher is the
antinomy that obtains between theory and praxis in his work. This antinomy, I will argue,
ultimately culminates in what we call a politics of experience that is operative and implicit in his
corpus.
As I seek to demonstrate in chapters 1–3, the encroachment of history upon Adorno’s
thought causes his thought and corpus to become themselves natural-historical: bearing the
marks of stasis and decay. Framing my engagement with Adorno through the lens of the
centennial of the October Russian Revolution will prove to heighten these dimensions of his
3

Pensky, “Three Kinds of Ruin,” 66.
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work. If Adorno’s oeuvre is natural-historical, then history may be understood to constitute its
proper Ur-text—an archi-writing that is made legible through his own object-dependence to
history. Adorno’s corpus can thus be regarded as a coded text whereupon unconscious writing is
transcribed that opens onto that which exceeds it. Finally, my historical and literary-driven
reading of Adorno will prove to be speculative insofar as it addresses the whole of his corpus so
as to explore how history informs it.
In his essay “The Climate of History: Four Theses” (2010), Dipesh Chakrabarty argues
that “the crisis of climate change calls on academics to rise above their disciplinary prejudices,
for it is a crisis of many dimensions.”4 In the space that remains for a final chapter, our
heretofore broad engagements with Adorno and Benjamin’s methodologies and interdisciplinary
models of criticism assist us in reckoning with—and even perhaps speculatively redressing—the
hyper-object of anthropogenic global warming through a prism of empirical-hermeneutical and
critical-speculative lenses. Chapter four, a critical reading of Melathopoulos and Stoner’s 2015
Freedom in the Anthropocene: 20th Century Helplessness in the Face of Climate Change,
attempts to allegorically constellate two historico-political trajectories, the history of the Left and
environmental politics. In the interest of wordcount limits, the essay is composed of a series of
thematic notes and places stylistic emphasis on historiographic citation.
Within this chapter we understand the broader history of the Left as constituting the
proper ‘prehistory’ of environmental politics, whence recognizable eco-politics and -movements
are grasped as emerging alongside and out of the New Left between the 1960s–80s in North
America and Europe. More generally, the essay queries how to narrativize the trajectory of ecopolitics and address its outcome, concerns which emerge from a more fundamental and pressing
question, I argue, of how to countenance contemporary environmental politics in light of the
4

Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History,” 215.
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encompassing history of the Left stemming from the early twentieth century and leading to the
present: from the traditional (1848–1910s) to the post-political (‘80s–contemporary) Left—a
trajectory we sketch in the first three chapters. From here, we seek to address the unsublatable
extremes and antinomies that animate contemporary eco-politics (on the levels of both theory
and praxis) in constellation with deeper historico-philosophical problematics that originate out
of, and tragically plague, the so-called history of the Left.

5

1. Looking Back on Adorno’s Late-Marxism
(On the Centennial of the Russian Revolution)

The delayed thinking of praxis always has
something inappropriate about it, even when
it puts it off out of naked compulsion.
—Adorno5

I. ‘1917’—100 Years On? (A Ruse)
Lenin—“Who, him? / His name is so strange. From the eagle it draws imperial or
historic power”; Lenin, whose very name has become synonymous and even conflated with the
portentous year of 1917—taking on a life of its own as ‘1917’; Lenin wrote in 1920 of the
October Russian Revolution’s “international significance” as lying in the “inevitability of a
repetition, on an international scale, of what we in Russian have gone through,” a repetition that
the fortuitous centennial of 1917 occasions us here to raise and hold open, as Lenin does in 1920:
understanding international significance [of the Russian Revolution] to mean the
international validity or the historical inevitability of a repetition on an international scale
of what has taken place in our country, it must be admitted that certain fundamental
features of our revolution do possess such a significance.6
The closure of the tendential world-shaping revolutionary praxis that issued from the
October Russian Revolution of 1917, caused not the least by a preponderance of geopolitical
5

Adorno, ND, 244.
Derrida, Glas, 1; my emphasis; Lenin, LWC, 7. See Lenin’s invocation of Ivan Krylov’s fable Eagle and the Hens
in “Notes of a Publicist.”
6

6

counter-revolutionary social force, occasioned Lenin’s—and, as we will see, many others’ who
shared his orientation—turn from concrete politics to a broader, more diffuse politics of
experience, evidenced in Lenin’s own remarkable late works, such as “Left-Wing” Communism:
An Infantile Disorder (1920) and “Notes of a Publicist” (1922).7 Already engaging in preserving
the emancipatory project he participated in unleashing, Lenin would speculatively if tentatively
write in 1920, “we already have considerable international experience which very definitely
shows that some of the fundamental features of our revolution have a significance which is not
local, not peculiarly national, not Russian only, but international.”8
***
What the repetition of 1917 here (and in 2017) entails is not so much ourselves revisiting
the event (—much less repeating Lenin’s gesture) as it consists of ‘history’ imposing itself upon
us via repetition. Being subject to this exogenous repetition, 1917/2017, we run the risk of not
being ready on account of our anxiety vis-à-vis an object we are not in control of. This ‘object’ is
history, understood here (minimally) as the alien, quasi-autonomous unfolding of an immanent
necessity despite its determinacy as emergent under conditions of capitalist modernity. History in
this former sense continues apace despite past postmodern attempts to declare the ‘end of
history,’ utterances which emerged distinctly in the late-twentieth century with the thawing of
the Cold War and the final collapse of the Soviet Union, among other trajectories and historical
junctures. If 9/11 did not falsify this master-narrative, then the 2016 election of Donald Trump,
Brexit, the recrudescence of neo-nationalisms and the political crisis of late-neoliberalism have
proven—in no matter how mystified a manner—that the course of history is still reroutable and,
7

In Luxemburg’s final writings, we also encounter a turn to speculation in response to defeat; see Luxemburg,
“Order Prevails in Berlin” (1918).
8
Lenin, LWC, 7.
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more fundamentally, that the world can be other than it is and has been.
That the relevance and legacy of 1917 has to be actively retrieved and construed in our
contemporary moment seems to be the greatest indicator of what the Russian Revolution means
for the present, in 2017. What 1917 ‘means’ for the present, I would argue, is fundamentally
obscure and unclear. When approaching this immense event today, one experiences the prima
facie distance and dissociation of our contemporary moment from arguably the most profound
attempt to change the modern world that has ever taken place. 1917 can thus be understood
allegorically as a mirror that reflects the present; it reveals this present, for instance, as not
revolutionary—as perhaps not even emphatically reformist; worse, maybe even sub-reformist,
with no sight of emphatic social transformation on the horizon. Even the profundity of 1917, it
seems, has become obscured; and so this incomprehensibility forces us to work our way back
into the problem of inheriting its legacy. As I will seek to explicate, Adorno’s life-work, which
he described in terms of “messages in bottles” (Flaschenposten), offers us one line to this past.9
***
Lenin engaged in what Adorno calls “open thinking” when he wrote above on the
universal significance of the Russian Revolution in 1920, amidst his and early Soviet Russia’s
retreat from world revolution into geopolitical isolation, culminating in the Thermidorian
adaptation to and internalization of defeat via Stalin’s putative socialism in one country.10 (—
Here we keep open the gap that has been closed shut again and again.) Lenin leaves the
international importance of the Russian Revolution vague—and purposefully so. Indeed, while
Lenin asserts the universal significance of the dwindling experience to which he bears witness
and reconstructs in “Left-Wing” Communism, he nevertheless acknowledges the “tremendous
9

Adorno, Minima Moralia, 209.
Adorno, CM, 293; Lenin, LWC, 7.
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difference between backward Russia and the advanced countries of Western Europe.”11 Thus in
retracing the Bolshevik experience to uncover its truth content while still grasping the
particularity of the Russian experience, Lenin echoes Kant for whom “critique means less to call
into question than to establish the universal principles for how something is possible.”12
Along with “Notes to a Publicist” and other of Lenin’s late works before his death in
1924, “Left-Wing” Communism is a work of auto-critique and, more modestly, self-clarification
during retreat after the failure of “world revolution” ca. 1917–1919/23.13 Lenin spoke of but did
not mystically predict the repetition of this event; indeed the title of the opening chapter of “LeftWing” Communism is explicitly reflexive: “In What Sense Can We Speak of the International
Significance of the Russian Revolution?” Nevertheless, Lenin comes close here to almost
speaking in a prophetic, eschatological tone; the “Russian model,” he writes, “reveals to all
countries something, and something very essential, of their near and inevitable future.”14
Adorno’s final published essay “Resignation” (1969) echoes Lenin’s “Left-Wing”
Communism most notably15 in one of its closing passages:
Whatever has once been thought can be suppressed, forgotten, can vanish. But it cannot
be denied that something of it survives. For thinking has the element of the universal.
What once was thought cogently must be thought elsewhere, by others: this confidence
accompanies even the most solitary and powerless thought.16
Such a gesture of holding open that which has been previously thwarted is expressed

11

Lenin, LWC, 7.
Wayne, Red Kant,1.
13
Lenin, LWC 84.
14
Lenin, LWC, 7.
15
Adorno’s “Resignation” also echoes Lenin’s critique of the anarchist and so-called ‘left-wing communist’
tendencies that emerged in the wake of the October Russian Revolution and the closure of world-shaping praxis. In
“Left-Wing” Communism Lenin is speaking topically to the regression of Marxism into anarchism that resulted from
the historical failure of Marxism. As Adorno writes in “Resignation,” “formerly progressive organizations that now
in all countries of the earth are developing the characteristic traits of what they once opposed. Yet this does not
invalidate the critique of anarchism. Its return is that of a ghost. The impatience with theory that manifests itself in
its return does not advance thought beyond itself. By forgetting thought, the impatience falls back below it”
(Adorno, CM, 292).
16
Lenin, LWC, 19–20.
12

9

earlier by Adorno and with greater intensity in his Negative Dialectics (1966) in a passage that
could be taken as an instance of the imputed ‘left melancholy’ or “a priori pain” of Adorno’s
thought:
Those who chide theory [as] anachronistic obey the topos of dismissing, as obsolete,
what remains painful [because it was] thwarted…What has been cast aside but not
absorbed theoretically will often yield its truth content only later. It festers as a sore on
the prevailing health; this will lead back to it in changed situations.17
What this sore might lead us back to if approached immanently, I will argue, is what is at
stake in Adorno’s self-described “messages in a bottle.” In a manuscript that was begun in 1942,
Adorno and Horkheimer would write of their collaborative work as a “message [Rede]”
addressed to an “imaginary witness…to whom we can pass it on—lest it perish with us.”18 In
1956, Adorno and Horkheimer further clarify their project of disseminating messages in a bottle:
[Horkheimer]…two sources of uncertainty are involved, if we continue to operate in the
realm of theory. Firstly, because what is produced in the way of theory no longer has
anything in common with Marx, with the most advanced class consciousness; our
thoughts are no longer a function of the proletariat. Secondly, it seems then as if we are
working on a theory for keeping in stock.
[Adorno] In the best case, it is theory as a message in a bottle.
[Horkheimer] In stock. Perhaps the time will come again when theory can be of use. A
theory that has ceased to have any connection with practice is art. What we need to
respond to is the question of whether we are doing philosophy as pure construct.19

17

Sloterdijk, CCR, xxxiii; Adorno, ND, 144.
Müller-Doohm, Adorno, 277. “In view of what is now threatening to engulf Europe…our present work is
essentially destined to pass things down through the night that is approaching: a kind of message in a bottle”
(Horkheimer quoted in Müller-Doohm, Adorno, 262). Adorno will reiterate this image in his work on Kafka and The
Hunter Gracchus, expressing here the tendency for such disseminated messages to themselves decay: “The best,
which is forgotten, is remembered and imprisoned in a bottle like the Cumaean sibyl. Except that in the process it
changes into the worst: ‘I want to die,’ and that is denied it. Made eternal, the transient is overtaken by a curse”
(Adorno, COL, 219). We should note the resemblance between Adorno and Horkheimer’s image of messages in a
bottle (symbolic of theory divorced from praxis) and Paul Celan’s account of the poem after Auschwitz: “A poem,
as a manifestation of language and thus essentially dialogue, can be a message in a bottle, sent out in the—not
always greatly hopeful—belief that somewhere and sometime it could wash up on land, on heartland perhaps.
Poems in this sense too are under way: they are making toward something” (Celan, Paul Celan, 115). Ingeborg
Bachmann similarly expresses this situation of language in her poem “Waiting Room”: “Language no longer unites.
/ What we share is waiting. / A chair / a bench / a window / through which light falls / into our room / onto our
hands / onto our eyes / and also / onto the floor. / Heal our eyes / so that we again find words, / bright ones that I can
say to you” (Bachmann, Darkness Spoken, 353).
19
Adorno & Horkheimer, “Towards a New Manifesto?”, 59.
18
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As we will explore, these cryptic utterances—much like those of Lenin above—are ones
of preservation as much as they are of retreat; they are expressions of preservation amidst
retreat.20
Nietzsche insists in “On the Uses and Abuse of History for Life” (1873) that we must
come to see the work of “historical writing,” which a priori revisits and thus repeats, as
potentially creative:
as long as the past must be written about as worthy of imitation, as capable of being
imitated, with the possibility of a second occurrence, history is definitely in danger of
becoming somewhat altered, reinterpreted into something beautiful, and thus coming
close to free poeticizing.21
Indeed, following Benjamin’s idea of origin (Ursprung) as a “maelstrom” (Strudel) that
emerges out of the “flow of becoming,” to recover the complex emergence (Entstehung) of a past
event a priori implicates us in its potential repetition—however far removed or distantly echoed
and transmuted this reiteration may be.22

II. Last Gasps for Air
Lenin’s German counterpart23 Rosa Luxemburg was spared from living through the
barbarism she presaged if, as she warned, proletarian socialism—over and against pettybourgeois democracy, or worse—was not attained.24 The barbarism she foresaw would result in
but would not be restricted to the blossoming of fascism across Europe, another World War and
20

Lenin’s self-conscious retreat is expressed, for instance, in his turn to allegory to express early Soviet Russia’s
cul-de-sac; see “By Way of Example” in “Notes to a Publicist.”
21
Nietzsche, On the Use and Abuse of History for Life.
22
Benjamin, Trauerspiel, 45; Samuel Weber amended trans. “[T]he gesture which tries to recover, distances fromby itself, it grows ever more distant…Identification is a difference to itself, a difference from-with itself” (Derrida,
Derrida & Education, 56).
23
See Rosa Luxemburg’s The Mass Strike, “What is German Bolshevism?” and other writings on the Russian
Revolutions.
24
Luxemburg quotes Engels in “The Crisis of Social Democracy” (1915): “Friedrich Engels once said, bourgeois
society confronts a dilemma: either the transition to socialism or relapse into barbarism. What does a ‘relapse into
barbarism’ mean at our height of European civilization?…This world war—this is a relapse into barbarism”
(Luxemburg quoted in Adorno, CM, 386).
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the unspeakable horrors of the twentieth century. While her own gruesome death had little effect
on the then-dwindling German Revolution, Shane Haffner describes her murder as the most
“historically potent event in the drama of the German Revolution” in his detailed history Failure
of Revolution: Germany 1918–19: “viewed now from almost a century later [her death] has
acquired something of the uncanny, incalculably far reaching effect of the event on Golgotha—
which likewise seemed to make little difference when it happened.”25 Despite the posthumous
caricatures that have taken hold of Lenin and Luxemburg (authoritarian and voluntarist,
respectively) both figures, through their post-histories, have become allegories and signposts to
the respective but interrelated German and Russian revolutionary experiences, which were
ultimately abortive.26
Bolshevism advanced, but did not solve of course, the twin crises of Marxism (as a
politics) and imperialist global capitalism (the latter evidenced by the lead-up to, outbreak, and
aftermath of the First World War) by seeing these crises as opportunities for transformation.
Lenin’s call to turn the world war amongst capitalist nation-states into a global “civil war”
between classes, and therethrough into a “world revolution,” sought to work through the failures
of the Second International (which had developed up until the outbreak of WWI, from 1889–
1914)27 by radicalizing Marxism via Bolshevism in changed conditions.28 This, to be sure, is
Lenin’s great, ambivalent gesture29 of seeing such defeat and crisis as—however
25

Haffner, Failure of Revolution, 140.
See Trotsky’s “The Transitional Program” (1938) and his other writings on the assessment of the failed German
Revolutions.
27
“‘Since August 4, 1914, German Social-Democracy has been a stinking corpse’—this statement will make Rosa
Luxemburg’s name famous in the history of the international working class movement” (Lenin, “Notes of a
Publicist”). In Lenin, Lukács remarks how “the different attitudes of the various socialist currents in 1914 were the
direct, logical consequences of their theoretical, tactical, and other positions up till then” (Lukács, Lenin, 40; no
emphasis). See Joll, The Second International (1955).
28
Lukács, Lenin, 49; Lenin, LWC, 84.
29
By ‘gesture’ I mean a delimited but irreducible act that calls to be grasped in both its becoming—i.e., its
movement or tendential opening-out-onto—and also its being-cut-short in becoming, i.e., its incompletion. Gesture
here and elsewhere in this thesis is also intended to emphasize the interpenetration of practice and theory, or action
26
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counterintuitively—opening up the space for advancing and deepening the crisis of capitalism,
and for pursuing possible transformation and potential freedom.
In 1919, two years after the Bolshevik seizure of state power, the prospect of socialist
world revolution would be firmly closed off by the failure of the German Revolution and the
symbolic murder of Luxemburg, leading to increased Soviet isolation. Bringing to a halt the
‘permanent revolution’ that Trotsky and, following him, Lenin postulated as the condition of
possibility for a successful world revolution in the tendential direction of socialism, the failure of
the German Revolution marked the beginning of the end of ‘classical Marxism.’ The latter can
be defined as the historical continuity that spans from Marx and Engels (ca. 184830) to Lenin,
Luxemburg and ends roughly with Trotsky’s assassination in 1940—a continuity which these
later figures could still lay claim to and cite.31 Yet of course Trotskyism had already become an
untenable form of revolutionary politics before the time of Trotsky’s tragic death.
In the wake of such defeat, Trotskyism and Frankfurt School-Critical Theory would both
assume the task of sustaining the moment of crisis and heightened critical (i.e., non-identical)
consciousness that was attained in 1917. Both would attempt to work through the crises and
failures of Bolshevism and the German Revolution,32 and more broadly, Marxism ca. 1914–
1924, albeit in different and divergent forms and settings, and in radically changed geopolitical
circumstances. In his retrospective essay “Those Twenties” (1963), Adorno explicitly voices a
perspective of tendential world revolution that aligns with the revolutionary purview of Lenin,

and self-understanding, in the supercharged historical ‘moment.’ This gestural character of action is invoked when
one speaks of, for instance, ‘Lenin in 1917.’ Addressing Lenin thus, Lukács writes, “[i]t was left to Lenin to make
the step from theory to practice; a step which is simultaneously—and this should never be forgotten—a theoretical
advance” (Lukács, Lenin, 46). See Slaughter, “What is Revolutionary Leadership?” which elaborates Lenin’s
developments for both Marxian theory and praxis.
30
In the essay “Society,” Adorno describes the critical concept of society as originating “around 1848” (Adorno,
“Society,” 10–11).
31
See Luxemberg, “On the Spartacus Program” (1918).
32
See Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour, xi–xii.
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Luxemburg and Trotsky:
Already in the twenties, as a consequence of the events of [the failure of the German
Revolution in] 1919, the decision had fallen against that political potential that, had
things gone otherwise, with great probability would have influenced developments in
Russia and prevented Stalinism.33

III. Late-Marxism: Separation Anxiety
It is always the case that whenever thinkers as powerful as Marx or Hegel or Kant arrive
at an impasse it is not a good idea to be too clever in resolving the resulting antinomies.
In general, it is far better to assure oneself of the necessity of such antinomies.
—Adorno34
In the unraveling of Marxism as a distinct, recognizable and sui generis form of politics35
(Lenin and Luxemburg, as both Korsch and Lukács argue (1923), offering some of the most
compelling embodiments of this breed of politics), which took place leading up to and
surrounding the outbreak of WWI and the resultant splintering of the Second International—of
which the politics and writings of Lenin and Luxemburg stand as two departures and radical
immanent critiques—Marxism is transmuted (minimally) into a problem of theory and praxis,
whose coerced unity (e.g., socialist realism, Diamat, etc.) represents the regression of this form
of non-identical politics, which from here enters into deep crisis. (As we will explore below, the
works of Benjamin, Adorno and Horkheimer ca. 1940–42 offer historical contextualizations of
this crisis, a crisis admittedly much deeper than that contained within the static theory/praxis
antinomy.) To be sure, constellating (in theory) ‘theory and praxis’ is necessarily an echo and
reduction of what historically constituted a dynamic exchange between (broadly speaking)
theory and praxis, e.g., as seen in Lenin and Luxemburg’s lived politics and writings. Such a
33
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decoupling, resulting from the above historical break, will compel late-Marxian theory to remark
upon its own ipseity and insufficiency in the face of its categorical antithesis, praxis, which
Adorno argues “appears in theory merely, and indeed necessarily, as a blind spot.”36
In a strong sense, amidst this dwindling (to critical consciousness) crisis, theory and
praxis become in disagreement following the historical failure of Marxism (minimally, the
historical self-consciousness of the Left) and thereby the Left. Adorno will write that “[t]hey
[theory and praxis] stand in a polar relationship.”37 In their antinomy, each pole gnaws on its
antithesis; yet Adorno does not lament this “separation”38:
If, to make an exception for once, one risks what is called a grand perspective, beyond
the historical differences in which the concepts of theory and praxis have their life, one
discovers the infinitely progressive aspect of the separation of theory and praxis, which
was deplored by the Romantics and denounced in their wake by the Socialists—except
for the mature Marx.39
Holding the historically determinate and fluctuating poles of theory and praxis together,
along with their respective demands, allows us to preserve, if only in altered and transmuted
form, the minimal structure of this historical dialectics at a standstill. (All the while not
forgetting spontaneity and what Adorno calls the “spontaneous moment”: “theory and praxis are
neither immediately one nor absolutely different…their relation is one of discontinuity. No
continuous path leads from praxis to theory—what has to be added is what is called the
spontaneous moment.”40)
36
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The above standstill can be expressed figuratively by the passage from Marx back to a
constellation of Hegel with Kant, with Marx nevertheless on the speculative horizon. More
precisely, philosophy can preserve Marxism, which is itself one step removed—as classical
Marxism understood it41—from philosophy, but only through a constitutive breakdown and
decoupling: through the regression of dialectics to (unsublatable) antinomies, which lateMarxian critique seeks to bring to light and express as moments of a regressive social totality,
containing

nevertheless—however

latently—emancipatory

potential

by

way

of

the

nonsynchronous working through of such reified forms of appearance. Through its misfire,
Marxism is forced to become a problem of philosophy and thereby becomes entangled with the
latter. Such an entanglement is expressed in Korsch’s Marxism and Philosophy on the
disagreement of Marxism and philosophy, and Adorno’s Negative Dialectics, which can be
understood as a further retreat into philosophy from Korsch’s suspension of Marxism and
philosophy.42

IV. Turn to Immanence
Having failed on world-historical proportions, Marxism is compelled to undergo
immanent criticism, which is the work Hegel classically assigned to philosophy vis-à-vis religion

Critical Theory are discontinuous with those of the ‘30s (when the Institute for Social Research was founded)—
writing, “our (old) theory has an internal political content, an internal political dynamic, that today, more than ever
before, compels us to concrete political positions…we have to write and act differently today than in the thirties”—
Adorno, by contrast, affirms such continuity (Adorno & Marcuse, “Correspondence on the German Student
Movement,” 129). Marcuse, in a later letter, would acquiesce to Adorno’s position, writing, “[a]ll that may not
amount to very much, but there is no revolutionary situation in the most advanced industrialized countries, and the
degree of integration simply delimits new, very unorthodox forms of radical opposition” (Ibid., 133).
41
See, for instance, Engels’ Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (1886).
42
Like Korsch, Adorno holds open the possibility that philosophy can abolish itself; in so doing he claims
inheritance of the tradition of Marx and Marxism. Adorno’s famous opening line from Negative Dialectics reiterates
Korsch’s contention in Marxism and Philosophy that “[p]hilosophy cannot be abolished without being realized”
(Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, 97).
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and art in his Aesthetics.43 This historically conditioned self-comprehension of Marxism would
crucially incorporate psychoanalysis, the language and discourse of unconditional suffering
under conditions of modernity wherein ostensibly anything can and should be said (by anyone).44
Such a critical employment of psychoanalysis was purveyed by figures such as Georg Simmel,
Siegfried Kracauer, Ernst Bloch and most forcefully by Wilhelm Reich, whose early work The
Mass Psychology of Fascism (1933) prefigured much later late-Marxism in its dialectical
intertwining of social theory (the philosophy of history, Marxism, sociology, etc.) with
psychology (psychoanalysis, social and group psychology, etc.).45 This specific interdisciplinary
constellation would later be classically articulated in Adorno’s “Sociology and Psychology”
(1955). The psychoanalytic turn in and resultant psychoanalytic dimension of Critical Theory
was codified with Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) which
undertook, among other projects, a deep archaeology of the modern bourgeois subject in
response to the barbarisms of the early twentieth century.46
Minimally, and to recapitulate, Adornian negative dialectics is an attempt to both
preserve the problem of the historical and geopolitical failure of Marxism (implicating thereby
the entire preceding history of the Left stemming from 1848) and to hold open and point,
perhaps, to Marxism’s reconstitution and reinauguration as a tendential revolutionary politics.
However, again, like History and Class Consciousness and Marxism and Philosophy (1923),
Adornian negative dialectics is a theoretical exploration of this problematic, and hence finds
43
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itself already bound up in the historico-philosophical (and however distantly, political)
unraveling of the tenuous “umbilical cord” Marx posited between theory and praxis, which
already led Marx himself to appropriately underscore in his “Theses on Feuerbach” (1845) “the
this-sidedness of…thinking” in the face of praxis.47
In the long aftermath issuing from 1917, Benjamin—before his own premature and tragic
death in flight of the Nazis (agents of the counter-revolution, and worse)—would contemplate
and engage in writing history from the vantage of the vanquished; and not simply the working
class as such but from the purview of those who had struggled to overcome capital but had failed
and/or had been betrayed in their attempts to do so. Of the latter, Rosa Luxemburg would be the
most tragic case, whom Benjamin would cite in his “On The Concept of History.” Benjamin’s
provocation of writing history from the standpoint of those who had failed to transform the world
would be recast by Adorno throughout his work, in critical objectification and more
hermetically, as “the unconscious writing of history.”48 To be sure, reading history against the
grain means, for both of these figures, reading history pathologically, i.e., through the lens of a
symptomatology that professes an avowed object-dependence to natural-historical regression.
Beyond these tasks of critical historiography (to be sure, a form of anti-historiography), Adorno
would also notably import Benjamin’s insights into the domain of philosophy proper, arguing
that “knowledge must [also]…present the fatally rectilinear succession of victory and defeat.”49
In spite of the seductions of dogmatic left-hermeneutics and the eschatologies of a certain
‘vulgar’ type of Marxism, the present is not legible in its entirety via a philosophy of the history
of the Left, seeing the tradition of the Left has, historically, privileged and thus excluded certain
voices over others. Nevertheless, it seems that any serious attempt to understand the
47

Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, 59; Marx, Marx-Engels Reader, 144.
Adorno, AT, 261.
49
Adorno, Minima Moralia, 152.
48

18

intransigence of the present, that is, the world as praxis-resistant (to speak nothing of the
regressive social forces that seem well at work today, not only on subjective and neo-national but
also on geopolitical levels), must work through this troubling and deep unconscious history of
the Left in the twentieth century that leads to the present. From the perceived need of such an
immanent

history

of

the

Left,

which

philosophical

history

methodologically

and

epistemologically makes possible, Adorno’s corpus will be of historical interest to us (and as we
will also see, of an interdisciplinary and therefore unconditional interest), insofar as his work
seems to dialectically register, both explictly and negatively, the decline of world-shaping praxis
and thereby the decline of the Left.
We should note, however, that Adorno’s work is not uniquely singular in this above
historical dimension. A similar case could be made for the corpuses of Cornelius Castoriadis and
Murray Bookchin, for instance, as they also critically register the post-1914–1923 historical
experience and its long aftermath, as well as the emergence of new forms of Left politics that
draw and/or break from past forms of such politics. For our purposes here, however, Adorno’s
negative dialectic productively stands at a certain historical crossroads, cresting with his death in
1969 before the post-‘60s–70s/New Left emergence of postmodernism and the global
transformations of neoliberalism took hold, but whose proper historical experience reaches as far
back as the 1910’s and ‘20s. In Adorno’s turn to immanence and philosophy (as we have seen,
for instance, to inherit and comprehend the failure of Marxism) the external world is refracted in
his work, yet only negatively—thus necessitating further criticism to decode such immanence,
which will constitute our task here.
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V. Dialectics of Defeat
In terms of Adorno’s contemporary reception, one of the most fruitful and provocative
engagements with his work has come from the Platypus Affiliated Society (PAS), an
organization originating from the University of Chicago and the courses of the late Moishe
Postone that is avowedly founded for “the reconstitution of Critical Theory.”50 One of the PAS’s
central theses that draws from Adorno is its so-called “dialectics of defeat,” which seeks to make
legible the decline or natural history of the Left over the course of the twentieth century, on the
levels of both social being and consciousness. 51 (In Negative Dialectics, Adorno would describe
the “objectivity of historic life” as “that of natural history,” in other words, a history that tends
toward sedimentation rather than self-overcoming.52) Of its many stages and moments of
devolution and decomposition, the parallel constructed between Adorno-Critical Theory and
Trotsky-Trotskyism is one the PAS’s most compelling and productive analyses—a historical
constellation we have already begun constructing above.
By the 1930s, Karl Korsch and Georg Lukács—arguably the two most important
theoreticians of not only the post-1914–19 crisis and failure but also of the inroads made by
Lenin and Luxemburg on the levels of both theory and praxis—had either become fervently antiSoviet (Korsch), or had weakened and adapted to Stalinism (Lukács).53 Yet Trotsky and his
movement stood standing in their attempt to reroute the failed world revolution and thereby
claim fidelity to the Russian Revolution; and the Institute for Social Research, founded in the
wake of the failed German Revolution, laid claim at its outset to the politics of Korsch and
Lukács’ works from the early ‘20s, approaching both of them (unsuccessfully) to head the
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Institute. Adorno (arguably the Institute’s most robust representative) and Trotsky thus become,
as myth has often had it, last men standing: Trotsky, the last defender of the Russian Revolution;
and Adorno, the lone champion of Hegelian-Marxism within German philosophy and sociology.
Indeed, Adorno’s work from beginning to end54 sought to sustain the insights of the earlier
Hegelian-Marxist tradition of Lukács and Korsch, which were born of what Korsch called “the
crisis of Marxism” and the abortive revolutions of the early twentieth century.
The distant but nonetheless affirmed affinity between Adorno and Lenin55 lies in the
former’s attempt to sustain the moment of crisis for critical consciousness and to hold in
constellation the once-empathic mediation, now broken-down, between theory and praxis that
Lukács and Korsch also sought to sustain in the immediate wake of Lenin and Luxemburg,
1914–1919/1924. Trotskyism is in many ways the torn half of Adornian Critical Theory. What
Trotskyism displays on the level of praxis—in its long disintegration: the becoming-impossible
and -farcical of this putatively revolutionary politics, as a result not the least of the counterrevolutionary effects of international capital—is what Adorno’s corpus inversely registers on the
level of theory: the retreat from praxis into the strongholds of theory. More broadly, however,
Adorno’s work indexes the natural-historical becoming-ossified of both theory and praxis into
the antinomy we have posed hitherto. As Adorno explicates, “[t]here is much to speak for the
54
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fact that cognition, whose possible relation to a transforming praxis is at least momentarily
crippled, would not in itself be any sort of blessing. Praxis is put off and cannot wait; theory, too,
ails from this.”56
Adorno’s retreat and resultant cul-de-sac57 are registered, for instance, in his argument
that it is in the “interest of praxis itself” “that theory should win back its independence.”58 Yet
here Adorno’s retreat into theory (over and against praxis) should not be confused with a
Heideggerian, let alone the post-Heideggerian, retreat into thinking contra institutionalized/
academic philosophy. Upon general-historical consideration, Adorno’s work becomes salient and
productive the extent to which it understands itself dialectically as only theory, or weak theory.
Perhaps what is most remarkable about the objectivated historical experience that is latent in
Adorno’s corpus is not its how’s or why’s but its very availability.

VI. Adorno as Archi-Writing
To reiterate, Adorno’s work now appears to trace and capture, however liminally or
indirectly, the problematic of the introjection of failure and defeat of self-determining
subjectivity and world-shaping collective praxis by means of his dialectical intertwining of
critically applied psychology and sociology. Through such tarrying (or being-beside-oneself),
Adorno’s corpus (in hindsight) appears to disinterestedly register—in the longue durée—the
decline of the Left in the twentieth century and thereby at the same time stands as a path by
which to recuperate this entropic history. (Such recuperation, as we will see, is made possible not
in the least by Adorno’s (like Benjamin’s) assimilation of the concepts of decay and transience—
56
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and more broadly, a philosophical concept of experience—into his thinking.)
Crucially, Adorno’s work registers not only how objective circumstances (for instance,
failure and defeat) can foreclose subjective possibilities via psychic introjection, but also how
subjective states-of-affairs can close off—on account of hypercathected psychic entrenchments
and calcified libidinal investments—subjective possibilities and psychic availability and thereby
objective, worldly possibilities. This is why psychoanalysis became essential for Adorno—to
overcome such sedimented enclosures wedded to a non-negotiable past, which molds the present
and future tenses. In his critical embrace and employment of psychoanalysis, Adorno’s work
indicates that self-determining collective praxis may be unthinkable without self-constituting,
‘strong’ subjects. As he would put it grossly but succintly in his essay “Is Marx Obsolete?”
(1968), “the signature of the age [late-capitalism] is the predominance of the relations of
production over the forces of production.”59 This thought-figure expresses, in Marxian
categories, the problematic of the regression of consciousness: minimally, that consciousness can
adapt and adjust itself to its objective social circumstances, instead of pushing the envelope
further.
Yet how, might we ask, can a figure who is so clearly not emphatically Marxist or openly
leftist have anything meaningful to say about the history of the Left and/or Marxism? To be
sure, Adorno’s imputed Marxism or leftism lies not in a manic or critical heroism. His pertinence
for putative Left politics rather lies in his work’s eloquence and the prima facie cryptic character
of his work, which points beyond the said proper to the saying itself via equivocal enunciation.60
An Adornian Marxism/leftism may thus seem a mere academic eccentricity, destined for only
further hermeticism and compounded esotericism. But this might only appear to be the case so

59
60

Adorno, COL, 119.
See Adorno, Hegel, 116.

23

long as we have not received his disseminated messages. As we will explore, Adorno’s work is
compelling first and foremost as a certain dialectical preservationism which is nevertheless
concerned primarily with the emergence of the new.
While Adorno’s meditations on non-identity and theory and praxis may not seem to relate
prima facie in any clear way to the history of the Left, a more heretical reader of Adorno such as
the art historian T.J. Clarke has argued that Adorno’s entire “lifetime [was] spent” “building ever
more elaborate conceptual trenches to outflank the [later] Third International,” i.e., the Stalinized
Third International. (As Adorno writes in “Resignation,” speaking to the effects of the
Stalinization of the Left, “formerly progressive organizations…now in all countries of the earth
are developing the characteristic traits of what they once opposed”61). Similarly, the radical
Marxist critic of Adorno, Chris Cutrone has boldly if perhaps grossly contended that Adorno
“considered his work—indeed, his entire life experience—to be a function of the aftermath of
this failure of Marxism that conditioned subsequent history”; more precisely, a function, Cutrone
writes, of “the defeat of the global uprising of 1917–19 at the end of World War I in which
avowedly Marxist political organizations took part, the series of revolutions in Russia, Germany,
Hungary and Italy.”62
Yet the politics of Adorno’s work, much like those of Benjamin’s, are no doubt cryptic
and weak—and avowedly so. Their collective works do not heroically profess an overt politics (a
tendential worldly orientation) but rather embody and proffer a pre-politics concerning the very
conditions of im/possibility for emancipatory politics. Politics where self-determining subjects
form collectives and democratically act in concert with one another; politics when “those who
61
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‘have no’ time take the time necessary to front up as inhabitants of a common space and
demonstrate that their mouths really do emit speech capable of making pronouncements on the
common which cannot be reduced to voices signaling pain.”63 To be sure, decoding the imputed
politics of Adorno’s corpus is as difficult as attempting to identify, for instance, the precise
political content of Benjamin’s unfinished Arcades Project. Given these hermeneutical
difficulties, Osborne and Charles’ following account of the politics of Benjamin’s work will also
be instructive for approaching those of Adorno’s:
Benjamin remarked that his break from the Youth Movement did not constitute the
abandonment of this earlier thought, however, but its submergence into a ‘harder, purer,
more invisible radicalism.’ This in part accounts for what T.J. Clark describes as the
‘cryptic’ character of—what Adorno termed—the anthropological materialism of The
Arcades Project, where, Clark comments, it is ‘as if such a politics were being actively
aired and developed elsewhere.’64
By reading Adorno’s own ‘invisible’ politics “associatively,” we will attempt to grasp—
as Adorno wrote apropos Hegel—“the compelling force of the objective phenomena that have
been reflected in his philosophy and are sedimented in it.”65

VII. Politics of Experience
In order to decipher and unfold the politics of Adorno’s work, his work must be
approached immanently. This is not the least to guard against the common tendency to hijack his
messages in a bottle, by means of which all disparate roads apparently lead to Adorno’s
Marxism. As Benjamin would write Adorno in a letter dated July 17, 1931, “it is a question not
simply of ‘applying’ Marxism like a coat of fresh paint, but rather of working with it, and that
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means, for all of us, struggling with it.”66 Our posing the question of Adorno’s disseminated
messages has not been and will hopefully not be a pretext for us to reassert or surreptitiously
retrieve a master metanarrative of history. Further, by thematizing what I will call a politics of
experience we will also attempt to move beyond the twin pitfalls of objectivism/voluntarism by
taking an immanent approach—thereby also allowing us to skirt the trappings of leftist
dogmatism, Heideggerian/authoritarian new ontology, and a manic hijacking of the object,
epitomized by accelerationist thought, wherein subject and object are collapsed. A politics of
experience, which we may also use to offset the seductions of Adorno’s Marxism (along with
these other above thought-predilections) is no doubt an emphatically weak ‘politics,’ much in the
sense in which Benjamin speaks of a “weak Messianic” power that the present holds in relation
to past unredeemed suffering.67
In the post-1914–1923 aftermath, Marxism as a sui generis form of politics loses its selfevidence and hence cannot be claimed and inherited without undergoing immanent critique. In
light of the eclipse of the political and its subsequent inversion and perversions, late-Marxism
would come to assume the historical task of developing an eloquent politics of experience, one
that places emphasis on critical experience if only so as to make possible emancipatory politics
as such. Adorno’s writings, as I will attempt to demonstrate, are avowedly pre-political in the
sense that they seek primarily to disclose a sedimentary experience of history and of what
Benjamin calls Lehre (teaching, doctrine) by gestically preserving and disclosing in writing
certain critical and to be sure recurrent aesthetic-artistic, psychological-sociological and
philosophical-historical experiences (among other forms of experience). Adorno grasps this
experiential manifold as transpiring under conditions of late-bourgeois society and capitalist
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modernity, both of whose mutual historical contradictions68 mark a shared form of unfreedom
and constraint: minimally, the unfolding of an immanent necessity. In a letter to Scholem,
Benjamin would describe the particular freedom inherent in “education” as that of “tradition
becoming visible and free.”69
Addressing Horkheimer in a transcribed dialogue, Adorno expresses the pre-political
dimension of their collaborative work in terms of its “pre-dialectical” character:
what we are doing is pre-dialectical, a leaping out of the dialectic…Today…where
everything is included and the world constitutes a unity as far as one can see, the idea of
‘otherness’ is one whose time has come. We might almost say that the dialectic, which
always contains an element of freedom, has come to a full stop today because nothing
remains outside it. What Hegel and Marx called utopianism has been rendered obsolete
by the present stage of history.70
Even Adorno’s most ostensibly political works, essays and utterances—consider the
above 1956 discussion with Horkheimer apropos a rewriting of Marx and Engels’ Communist
Manifesto—are eminently pre-political in that they are primarily concerned with exploring
present and past (minimal) conditions of im/possibility for both self-determining subjectivity (on
an individual-monadic scale) and world-shaping praxis (on the level of collective praxis), both of
which persist in the present as reified but in ruins, i.e., objective but alienated possibilities. As
we have witnessed hitherto, such conditions of im/possibility are explored by Adorno by means
of deploying critical concepts such as non-identity and by topically addressing enduring
historically-sedimented antinomies that manifest themselves in both theory and praxis.
The above ruins which are registered in Adorno’s corpus ensure his work’s continued
relevance despite the common tendencies to dismiss his work and/or him ad hominem. History,
in Hegel’s emphatic—if problematic—sense of the self-conscious unfolding of freedom, has yet
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to liquidate Adorno’s work, which registers a persistent and shared narrative emplotment of
unfreedom. Nor in any case has history qua freedom liquidated the works Adorno himself
sustains, like those of Marx, as Adorno argued in his 1968 lecture “Is Marx Obsolete?” (to which
he answered in the negative). In addition to holding open the theory/praxis antinomy, which
stands as one of the defining and most productive aporias of Adorno’s corpus, Adorno’s
continued relevance also rests upon his—like Benjamin’s—inheritance and reconfiguration of
Kritik in the long aftermath of the collapse of German Idealism. Immanent critique inaugurated
by Kant as, very broadly here, the exploration of conditions of possibility for experience and its
transformation.
For Adorno, the discontinuous histories of art, philosophy, literature, etc. produced under
conditions of capitalist modernity, are catalogues of experiences by means of which the past,
present and perhaps a post-capitalist future are re/determinable. History is recursive and under
conditions of modernity there is, pace Derrida and Deleuze, no such thing as pure repetition but
only repetition in its possible devolution (what Marx calls farce) or its potential recuperation and
advancement. Such an advancement is expressed, for example, in Lenin’s identification of early
20th century capitalist imperialism as the “highest state of capitalism,”71 in other words, the final
stage of capitalism announced by self-determining revolutionary subjectivity. This deepening is
expressed in praxis with the Bolshevik seizure of the state and in theory with Trotsky’s wager of
“permanent revolution” and Lenin’s State and Revolution (1917), the latter a critical book-report
on Marx and Engels’ scattered writings on the state. And yet potential recuperation, even if
successful, can only entail further distancings and further slidings of experience into new unsure
stages of crisis of both consciousness and social praxis. This was a problematic Trotsky
registered in Lessons of October (1924), which retraces the crises of critical consciousness at
71
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events and periods of historical and political rupture surrounding the Russian Revolutions of
1917.
The twin theoretical pitfalls Adorno navigates that are expressive of his cul-de-sac are
that of, on the one hand, a melancholic decathexis (found, for instance, in an escapist retreat into
the disinterested strongholds of theory and critique); and on the other hand, a manic hypercathexis finding expression in an epistemological authoritarianism that results from hijacking the
‘messages in a bottle’ (seen, for instance, in a praxis that subordinates theory to itself). Neither of
these poles, of course, are completely avoidable, an acknowledgement that is expressed in
Adorno’s antinomic thought-figure, “[t]he dialectical critic of culture must both participate in
culture and not participate. Only then does he do justice to his object and to himself.”72 Adorno’s
cathexis of natural-historical decline by way of self-comprehending and -memorializing criticism
(what Pensky calls Adorno’s practice of “critical memory”) occasions the question of the
relaxing of such cathexis, more precisely, of memorialization’s antithesis: forgetting, or more
emphatically, active forgetting in Nietzsche’s sense.73
It is this latter sense of forgetting which opens up rapt historical memorialization to its
antithesis, praxis. 74 Adorno singled out such a categorical hairpin turn as Benjamin’s proper
“bequest”: “to bring the intentionless within the realm of concepts: the obligation to think at the
same time dialectically and undialectically.”75 In “On the Use and Abuse of History for Life,”
Nietzsche conceives of forgetting as an activity that can be in the service of life, and which can
thus be supra- or post-historical insofar as historical forgetting (e.g., collective praxis) can
overcome a form of remembering or cathexis of the past. To actively forget in Nietzsche’s sense
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holds out the possibility for not only overcoming a need to remember but also overcoming the
past itself, the latter understood as a manifold of unresolved problems that weigh upon the
present.

VIII. Turn to Historicism
The name of history may not be spoken since what would truly be history, the Other, has
not yet begun.—Adorno76
Indexing the retreat into critique and autonomous theory, the late-Marxian go-for-broke
turn to critical historiography reaches a fever pitch in Benjamin’s hermetic meditations in “On
the Concept of History” (1940).77 This turn Benjamin instigates is affirmed by Adorno’s further
recoiling response, “Reflections on Class Theory” (1942), as well as one of Horkheimer’s more
radical works, “The Authoritarian State” (1940), both written in response to Benjamin’s above
(and perhaps final) work and premature death.78 To be sure, these three essays represent Critical
Theory’s moment of absolute recoil, the latter two of which cannot be understood exclusively on
the basis of the historically proximate traumas of Benjamin’s suicide and Hitler’s enunciation of
the final solution. Indeed, in “Reflections on Class Theory” we encounter Adorno writing in the
language of a Marxism in extremis and under-erasure:
According to [Marxian] theory,79 history is the history of class struggles. But the concept
of class is bound up with the emergence of the proletariat. Even when it was still
revolutionary, the bourgeoise called itself the third estate. By extending the concept of
class to prehistory, theory denounces not just the bourgeoise, whose freedom, together
with their possessions and education, perpetuates the tradition of the old injustice. It also
turns against prehistory itself.
By exposing the historical necessity that had brought capitalism into being, [bourgeois]
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political economy became the critique of history as a whole…All history is the history of
class struggles because it was always the same thing, namely, prehistory. This gives us a
pointer as to how we can recognize what history is. From the most recent form of
injustice, a steady light reflects back on history as a whole. Only in this way can theory
enable us to use the full weight of history to gain an insight into the present without
succumbing in resignation to the burden of the past.
The irreconcilable power of the negative that sets history in motion is the power of what
exploiters do to the victims. As a shackle binding one generation to the next, it functions
as an obstacle to both freedom and history. The systematic unity of history [found in
“Marxism” “as a philosophy”], which is supposed to give meaning to individual suffering
or else demote it from on high to the level of something fortuitous, is the philosophical
appropriation of the labyrinth in which men have toiled to this day, the epitome of
suffering.80
In turning to historical critique, Adorno elucidates the origins and conditions of
possibility for the irreversible break Marx’s work instigated. Chief among these origins were the
“bourgeois upheavals” to which, however, “the bourgeois was unable to find a successor” when
bourgeois society, under conditions of capitalist modernity, came into self-contradiction.81 In
Marx’s hands, the proletariat was thus simultaneously a historically concrete (sociological) and
speculative category. As Adorno explicates above, Marx’s breakthrough was also achieved
through an immanent critique of bourgeois political economy which came into self-contradiction
as well. Marx’s corpus and subsequently Marxism as a politics were predicated on the
condemnation of history—including the history of capitalist society hitherto—as prehistory,
insofar as it took part in the unfolding of an immanent necessity.82
These three above works by Benjamin, Adorno and Horkheimer index their shared
impulse to retreat into ‘critique’ (the exploration of conditions of im/possibility for change), and
more specifically, historically-insulated critique, when robust forms of self-constituting
subjectivity and collective praxis are at a standstill, or worse, regressing—on account of
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pernicious counter-revolutionary social forces and the psychic internalization of defeat. Indeed,
as Horkheimer and then Adorno forcefully argue in these works:
Sociological and psychological concepts are too superficial to express what has happened
to revolutionaries in the last few decades: their will toward freedom has been damaged,
without which neither understanding nor solidarity nor a correct relation between leader
and group is conceivable.83
The immeasurable pressure of domination has so fragmented the masses that it has even
dissipated the negative unity of being oppressed that forged them into a class in the
nineteenth century. In exchange, they find they have been directly absorbed into the unity
of the system that is oppressing them. Class rule is set to survive the anonymous,
objective form of the class.84
Through their synchronous turns to historical critique these thinkers reveal, however
negatively, that an implicit historical self-understanding (Selbst-Darstellung) was the condition
of possibility for emancipatory social praxis as it had come to be known historically, leading up
to the aftermath of WWI and the failure of socialist world revolution issuing from the October
Revolution and elsewhere. Registering the decline and eclipse of such self-presentation, these
works overcompensate for this waning by enacting that which is dwindling. Horkheimer, in
particular, oscillates between utter despair—“whoever cares for a human arrangement of the
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world can look to no court of appeal, to existing or future power”—and self-determined hope.85
In the following passage he ends with what could be construed as a hopeless plea:
The revolution that ends domination is as far-reaching as the will of the liberated. Any
resignation is already a regression into prehistory…The theoretical conception which,
following its first trailblazers, will show the new society its way—the system of worker’s
councils—grows out of praxis. The roots of the council system go back to 1871, 1905,
and other events. Revolutionary transformation has a tradition that must continue.”86
What was implicitly operative in praxis has to be recovered immanently, and
nonsynchronistically, by way of a dialectic of retrieval whereby the critique of contemporary
forms of antinomic appearance are animated by the presentation of their historical sedimentation.
In light of such natural-historical decay that can be registered on levels both sociological and
psychological, it would appear that the memory of both Marxism and the struggle for socialism
can only be accessed through a critical experience of tradition—a brush with history that both
theory and art are capable of offering. As Horkheimer puts the matter to Adorno in their 1956
dialogue, “we cannot rely on the assumption that people will still have any memories of
socialism.”87 Adorno’s work, in particular, stands as a cipher for understanding what it might
mean to say that the struggle for socialism has been relinquished. Such an understanding is made
possible through his general thesis of the regression of consciousness, which explicates how
consciousness can adapt, conform and even fall beneath a regressive social totality.88 Engaged
retrospectively from the present, Adorno’s corpus compels us to retrace these faltering steps of
regression.
What we are calling late-Marxism is a decathected Marxism and hence no longer an
emphatic Marxism operating on the levels of theory and praxis (as is found in Lenin and
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Luxemburg); instead, late-Marxism constitutes a dialectical image of what Marxism was. (This,
however, is not to say Adorno was not a Marxist in a strong sense.) The above retreat into
critique effectuates the becoming-writing and -aesthetic of late-Marxism: on the level of the text
itself, and in its turn to problems surrounding aesthetics, more precisely, the relation between
politics and aesthetics.89 The two-fold becoming-aesthetic of late-Marxism thus indexes, more
generally, the retreat of world-shaping praxis (prefigured in Lenin and Luxemburg’s final
reflections that similarly turn away from concrete politics and toward a politics of experience);
and more distantly, the pernicious counter-revolutions whose preponderance led to the
internalization of defeat (seen most conspicuously in the pervasive introjection of Stalinism), the
latter a problematic dialectically registered in Wilheim Reich’s discourse on “the fear of
freedom,” and echoed in Frantz Fanon’s discourse on the “pathology of freedom.”90
For

late-Marxism

these historico-political

crises occasion

enduring

historico-

philosophical problematics that serve to hold open the wounds of their imminent enclosures; for
instance, Lukács on reification; Korsch on philosophy and Marxism; Benjamin on the
philosophy of history; and Adorno on the non-identity of theory and praxis. Adorno will
simultaneously address all of these concerns in a single train of thought from his Lectures on
Negative Dialectics: “The separation of theory and praxis is itself an expression of reified
consciousness. And it is the task of philosophy to dismantle the rigidity, the dogmatic and
irreconcilable character of this separation.”91 The textual-literary effects that these problematics
effectuate include most notably the becoming-sedimented and -hermetic of the text; in other
words, the introduction of tarrying into late-Marxism.
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IX. Conclusion
Late-Marxism’s broad turn to matters of aesthetics—culminating in Adorno’s
asystematic critique of the history of (late-)modern art in Aesthetic Theory—became the
necessary if conditional theatre in which to carry out the program of a politics of experience by
means of mobilizing the messages in bottles that find their grounding in critical historical
experience. To be sure, this is a program seeking ultimately to foster self-constituting subjects
and collective self-determining praxis democratically embodying and struggling in the direction
of a post-capitalist social arrangement. The politics of experience operative in the works of these
figures thus stands as not only a placeholder of sorts for emancipatory politics; as pre-political, it
also serves as a tendential umbilical cord to emancipatory politics, while simultaneously
exposing the latter’s im/possibility. Hence to speak of such a pre-politics is simply to strive to
make exoteric and democratically available a critical experience of history (which we have
begun to explicate) that Benjamin and Adorno collectively assumed and in some sense took for
granted—an experience which is otherwise intimate and esoteric (as seen in their letter
correspondence). To be sure, their shared experience of the present “traverses life with the speed
of lightning,” reaching nimbly (if helplessly) back into the past to comprehend the now-time, but
never out of injury for the present in its singularity and availability to spontaneity and futural
plasticity.92 Their combined works can be read today as supercondensing the history and critical
experience of capitalist modernity into a calculus of citable gestures, which intermingle in a
differentiated chorus.
It is here that Susan Buck-Morss’ remark—to paraphrase, that artists have more
interestingly engaged Benjamin’s work than philosophers and academics—becomes of crucial
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importance.93 One would have to look no farther than a filmmaker such as Chris Marker or the
late work of Jean-Luc Godard to corroborate Buck-Morss’ judgment that, historically, artists
have exhibited a more compelling disclosive capacity for a Benjaminian-Adornian politics of
experience than that of ‘discourse’ (e.g., contemporary philosophy, theory, art criticism, etc.).94
Immanent to the idea of such a Benjaminian-Adornian pre-politics are its concepts of form,
presentation and disclosure which serve to produce in language a critical experience of history in
both its freedom and (hypostatized) unfreedom. Herein lies, we should note, the proximity of
Benjamin and Adorno’s thought to the knowledge of (modern) literature, which is closer, we
might venture, to experience than discourse and theory by way of its immanence to experience
and the forms of life.
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2. Reading Adorno’s Interdisciplinary Dialectical Criticism

…certain illegible traces, like chalk dust on
a blackboard after it has been erased, so we
must learn to recognize it as the form—the
only one—in which such fragments of the
true learning as we are destined to receive
will be vouchsafed to us, if at all.
—John Ashbery95

I. Approaching Adorno
Receiving Adorno’s messages in a bottle requires us to decathect ‘what’ Adorno sought
to digest (history, broadly speaking) from his thought proper and ask speculatively how this
process of (put crudely) digesting experience might be of pertinence given the needs of the
present (as we will explore in chapter 4). In taking up Adorno’s work, we find ourselves
compelled to divest it of its congealed and thereby quasi-non-negotiable character which results
from his dialectical dissensus vis-à-vis the object of critique, which is preponderantly
historically-sedimented. The end of such decathexis, the goal of relaxing Adorno’s grip, will be
to open up availability to what is otherwise tendentially muted when strictly approaching his
criticism in its (pre)cathected character. This overdetermined cathexis manifests itself perhaps
most conspicuously in Adorno’s quasi-authoritarian (if aporetic) formulations, such as “[i]t is
self-evident that nothing concerning art is self-evident anymore, not its inner life, not its relation
to the world, not even its right to exist”; or his controversial proscriptions concerning writing
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‘poetry’ after Auschwitz.96 Yet Adorno often acknowledges this congealed dimension of work,
such as when he remarks how “[t]he prohibitions [dictated by his philosophical criticism] are
both gentle and strict.”97 Loosening Adorno’s grip thus means engaging his work via the critical
model of allegory so as to decouple historical experience and philosophical reflection.
To thematize the unpleasant—indeed perhaps for some, insufferable—tarrying operative
in his work, which stems from a deeper, intransigent submission to history, is to highlight the
rapt cathexis immanent to his writing that results from the work of criticism. Take, for example,
the opening lines of Adorno’s 1965 radio talk “Sexual Taboos and Law Today” which are
expressly indicative of the weighty character of his writing and thought:
The theorist who intervenes in practical controversies nowadays discovers on a regular
basis and to his shame that whatever ideas he might contribute were expressed long ago
—and usually better the first time around. This means that time-honored arguments must
once again be trotted out.98
To be sure, it would be typical and even stereotypical to read this passage as sententious
and condescending,99 when in fact it might also represent the humility (deference to past critical
figures) and submissiveness (immanence to tradition and history) of Adorno’s thought. Isolating
such tarrying further enables us to highlight—and thereby prevents us from fetishizing—‘what’
is being tarried-with (the historically-sedimented object, subjectively yet allegorically cathected),
preventing us, moreover, from reifying the thought. To do so is to open up and return thought to
the stream of becoming whence it emergences as a maelstrom (Benjamin) or whirlpool
(Schelling). Yet upon decathecting Adorno’s work we find that his thought is itself already
immanently allegorical (and therefore not symbolic, to invoke Benjamin’s distinction) in that it
reflexively remarks upon its own historically and thus singularly determinate cathexis.
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As Shierry Weber Nicholsen has pointed out,100 the desire to simply ‘better understand’
Adorno tends to only mean over-academicizing his work (i.e., making the task of inheriting his
corpus a matter of strict hermeneutics) and thereby prevents us from critically reckoning with
what is at stake in his corpus. Guarding against the pitfalls of the entrenched academic practices
surrounding Adorno (which reduce his work, for instance, to simply a critique of late-capitalist
society, instrumental rationality, etc.), immanently approaching his work by posing Adorno’s
question of messages in a bottle—and not having a preordained regulative hermeneutics readyat-hand (e.g., Marxism)—forces us to imaginatively and speculatively engage his work. (With
regard to these former academic practices, it should be noted that a strictly scholarly or textbased study of, say, the origins of negative dialectics might operate entirely immanently, that is,
strictly on the level of discursivity—and thereby miss the extra-textual and -discursive messages
in a bottle. To be sure, it is a danger inherent to archaeologically-driven work that what is extradiscursive might be repressed and hence not be adequately acknowledged as intimately
constitutive of discourse proper.) However, when engaging Adorno’s work speculatively, we
quickly encounter that his work is itself already speculative and thereby extra-empirical—yet
only by way of immanent dialectical critique. To glimpse the speculative-spiritual moment of
Adorno’s thinking, which is grounded in the empirical-experiential, we need only recall the
opening lines of his important work of pedagogy, “Education after Auschwitz.”
Adorno begins this essay with the assertion that “the premier demand upon all education
is that Auschwitz not happen again,” a plea for which he does not believe he needs to adduce
supporting evidence, as scientific discourse might put it.101 He writes: “Its priority before any
other requirement is such that I believe I need not and should not justify it. To justify it would be
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monstrous in the face of the monstrosity that took place.”102 In the spirit of Adorno, we also need
to be willing to sacrifice certain scientific and discursive requirements in order to conduct
unconditional interdisciplinary research and writing, and to make larger claims that adequately
respond to the enormity of events and phenomena with which cultural criticism is tasked with
reckoning—yet that all the while remain immanent to the object of critique.
To engage Adorno’s disseminated messages immanently, and so not be “above” them (as
Adorno cautioned against when approaching the work of Hegel), is comparable to asking what
the present is “in the face of” Adorno.103 Indeed, anything less risks not only mistaking the
re/search of origin (Ursprung) as an end in itself, but also failing to acknowledge the ‘new’ that
is both anterior and immanent to origin, which gives rise to the impulse and consequent research
of origin in the first place. To mistake origin for the goal would mean, for example, failing to
grasp the political and historical emplotments within which Adorno’s Negative Dialectics or
Benjamin’s Arcades Project were undertaken and operate, and the past, present and futural
modalities the works open out onto.
For all of Adorno’s emphasis on maintaining not only the primacy of the object but also
sustaining (and so not collapsing) the contradictions that fissure the object—in short, his critical
object-dependence—it is easy to forget that his criticism also sought to make itself obsolescent.
Counterbalancing his natural-historical criticism, this latter intention highlights Adorno’s
allegiance to a Hegelian-Marxism that strives to sublate philosophy into a broader economy. The
gesture of grasping what is unsublatable in the object and, through the work of criticism,
pointing to its possible (self-)overcoming is the dialectical dimension of Adorno’s thought, and
expresses in miniature the potential of philosophy to abolish itself through historical self-
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liquidation. That Adorno can still be of historical interest to us and have a certain purchase on the
present indicates that his work is not yet exhausted or obsolete, and moreover, that we continue
to share with him, as well as Marx, the ‘this-sidedness’ of theory, which always finds itself
outstretched—yearning to find its terminus and liquidation in and through praxis. Indeed, the
continued purchase of Adorno’s work may be generally understood to be a function of its
immanent relation to both history and to what has transpired since Adorno’s death, i.e., his
work’s unforeseeable post-history. Beyond the obvious difficulties of receiving his work in the
Anglo-American context, Nicholsen has keenly given voice to a shared sense of “the presence of
some fundamental problem in grasping [Adorno’s] work that we have yet to overcome.”104 “One
senses,” she continues, “that we have still not plumbed the real implications of the work. It is
almost as though the sense of familiarity masks an inaccessible core of the work that has so far
proved impervious to appropriation.”105 Following Nicholsen, this hermeneutical problem can be
overcome, she argues, by “imaginatively appropriating his work.”106 For our purposes here, this
means approaching Adorno’s work compositionally, which will be achieved by creating “a
mosaic,” as Nicholsen writes, “in which diverse elements from his life and work are
juxtaposed.”107

***
II. Interlude: Theory & Praxis, An Origin Story
In the interest of further exploring the dissensual relation between theory and praxis that
obtains in Adorno’s corpus, it will be productive to broach his early formative relation to the
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eminent Viennese composer Alban Berg (1885–1935) of the Second Viennese School. As
evidenced by his various biographies, Adorno’s tutelage under Berg constitutes one of the many
primal scenes of his oeuvre.108 Adorno first met Berg when the latter came to Frankfurt in the
spring of 1924 “for a premiere performance of fragments from his opera Wozzeck, conducted by
Hermann Scherchen.”109 Adorno was in the audience, and “[o]vercome by the music,” he
recounts that he “begged Scherchen, with whom I had contact, to introduce me to Berg. In a few
minutes it was agreed that I should come to Vienna as his student.”110
In terms of Adorno’s own overarching aesthetic theory, which draws heavily from the
various disciplines of psychology and psychoanalysis, it goes without saying that in order for
there to be robust artistic production, creativity and praxis, there must also be certain auspicious
psychic and social conditions in place. Faced with the decision of whether to pursue the career of
a composer during his time with Berg, Adorno’s forsaking of this path entailed his own personaloccupational displacement from praxis, a self-distancing that constitutes an internal tension in his
own work and which only complicates his inheritance of the fraught Marxian relation between
theory and praxis. Adorno’s early relation to Berg consequently sets the tone for his ensuing
corpus not as simply a biographical, Kierkegaardian either/or (composer/scholar) but more
crucially, as a problematic immanent to his thought and the peculiar physiognomy of his work.
Adorno’s drive to conceptualize and comprehend, which he harnessed through the
medium of writing in his emphatically modernist, self-revolutionizing life-work, posed serious
problems for his ability to commit wholly to artistic praxis, that is, to become a composer. The
following humorous anecdote offered by Susan Buck-Morss (who has gone perhaps farthest in
apprehending Adorno’s work compositionally) evidences this near neurotic drive of Adorno’s:
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Whenever there was an opportunity, Adorno accompanied Berg and his wife to concerts
and, of course, to the opera. On one occasion, they heard Mahler’s Eighth Symphony
conducted by Anton von Webern. They became so excited about the music that they
talked too loudly and ‘were almost thrown out for rowdiness.’111
Adorno’s compulsive drive to conceptualize—here, the impulse to discuss and
comprehend musical praxis—was only later met with enthusiasm by Berg whereas with
Schoenberg, infamously, it never made sense. At first, as Buck-Morss explains, “Berg did not
much appreciate Adorno’s ‘philosophical ballast,’ which he referred to as ‘fad.’”112
Having “serious aspirations to become a composer,” Buck-Morss so writes of Adorno,
we can imagine he could indeed have become a professional composer and/or musician.113 Yet
Buck-Morss notes how he “was not [musically] prolific” and “had little success in getting his
music performed”; and as Stefan Müller-Doohm has detailed, this was largely due to the
immense amount of time he devoted to writing music criticism and philosophy.114 Ultimately,
Buck-Morss explains, Adorno “returned to Frankfurt after little more than a year [of studying
under Berg] in order to resume his study of philosophy with the hope of obtaining a university
teaching position. The reasons for his leaving Vienna are unclear.”115 But as Buck-Morss reliably
speculates, “Adorno was perhaps too reflective, too self-conscious, and lacked the spontaneity
necessary for uninhibited composing. He may have realized that, given his penchant for
philosophy, he was better suited to musical criticism than composition.”116 Adorno’s concern
with composition, however, would nevertheless persist and survive in the critical work he
produced throughout his life—his writings relating to history allegorically in a manner
comparable to that of music. As such, we are compelled to engage Adorno not simply in terms of
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strict argument, but we must also attempt to play his ideas and thought—as Adorno wrote
apropos Hegel—“with the speculative ear as though they were musical notes.”117
***

III. Experience and Criticism
The enduring purchase of Adorno’s work lies in his straightforward project of
philosophically digesting critical experience, by means of which experience and philosophical
reflection are nevertheless maintained as non-identical.118 In his “Dialectical Epilegomena” to
Negative Dialectics, comprising his late works “Marginalia to Theory and Praxis” and “On
Subject and Object,” Adorno would remark that these essays brought “together, intentionally,
philosophical speculation and drastic experience.”119 Such a constituitive non-identity of
philosophical criticism and aesthetic experience became a necessity in modernity, a need Hegel
classically addressed in his Aesthetics.120 In his early essay “The Social Situation of Music”
(1932), Adorno assumed this post-Hegelian problematic in analogizing the task of “present-day
music” (and modern art, more broadly) to that of critical “social theory,” arguing that they share
the same “aporias” and, moreover, are both “under the same obligation” to fufill their respective
“dialectical cognitive function[s],” that is, to occasion critical acknowledgement.121 Buck-Morss
lends clarity to the post-Hegelian problematic that Adorno inherits when she succinctly defines
the interlinking tasks of modern art and criticism: “[Artists’] work is to sustain the critical
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moment of aesthetic experience; our job as critics is to recognize this.”122 The circuit Adorno
thus establishes between art and critique, between experience and philosophical reflection, often
leads him—as he was fond of doing, for instance, apropos a Brecht or a Beckett—to place an
artist’s own self-understanding (of their art) against their art as such. As Lydia Goehr will put
this matter in the context of the philosophy of music, “it is not uncommon to hear a tension
existing between what musicians claim they want to do with music and what they actually do.”123
Accordingly, this parallax serves to inform and guide our own reading of Adorno.
Perhaps one cannot fully grasp the stakes of philosophical reflection and criticism unless
one has explored the rich context—in short, experience—whence a form of thought has emerged.
Such conditioning biographical and historical factors, which call to be held in constellation with
the substantive content of philosophical activity, negatively delineate, for our purposes here, the
equiprimordial-constitutive blindnesses and insights of Adorno himself as well as his work and
corpus proper. Consequently, an account of the origins of negative dialectics must look equally
to exogenous historical experience as well as the immanent stream of discursivity and tradition.
For W.E.B. Du Bois124 as for Adorno, the origins of a negative dialectics, that is, a
Hegelian dialectics sans reconciliation, arise from the distinctly modern experience of unfreedom
in the failed attempt of struggling to overcome one’s own individual, collective and worldhistorical entanglement under conditions of global capitalism. In Adorno’s case, as well as Du
Bois’, such a transmutation of dialectics is born of both an immanent critique of Hegel as well
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one’s own proper historical experience. As Adorno would explicate in “Reflections on Class
Theory,”
Dynamism is merely one side of dialectic: it is the side preferred by the belief in
practicality, masterful action, the indefatigable ‘can-do’ attitude, because constant change
is the best way to conceal the old untruth. The other, less popular aspect of dialectic is its
static side. The self-movement of the concept, the conception of history as a syllogism, as
it is to be found in Hegel’s philosophy, is no developmental doctrine. It was only turned
into one by the collusive misunderstanding of the humanities. The law that, according to
the Hegelian dialectic, governs the restlessly destructive unfolding of the ever-new is also
the old lying close at hand. The new does not add itself to the old but remains the old in
distress, in its hours of need, as it becomes topical as an immanent contradiction through
its act of reflection, its indispensable confrontation with the universal in the old. Thus
throughout all its antithetical mediations, history remains one vast analytic proposition.125
In Adorno’s work, as exemplified in this passage, critique strives to establish a
continuous circuit between the post-Kantian concepts of freedom and the concepts of nature
(unfreedom), and more broadly, between discursivity and historical experience proper. Through
such capacious mediation, Adorno’s model of critique overcomes a central problem internal to
Kant’s philosophy—what Kant himself called “the great chasm”—as well as its Neo-Kantian
recrudescence, the latter which followed the waning presence of Hegelian philosophy in Western
Europe in the late 19th century and became “the dominant pre-World War One philosophy.”126
Adorno would follow Benjamin’s early 1918 metacritique of Kant and the pervasive NeoKantianism of his day, where Benjamin offered one of his first articulations of the idea of a
‘dialectics without synthesis’ (or constellation), which sought to tenuously mediate between the
post-Kantian spheres of reason (freedom) and nature/experience (unfreedom). Through such a
short-circuiting of mediative integration (synthesis), Benjamin broadened the philosophical space
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(traditionally conceived as the aesthetic—from Kant on) between these two traditionally distinct
and antithetical spheres—a philosophical gesture Adorno would embrace and further develop.
For Benjamin, and Adorno following him, the aesthetic sphere may be thought of as a mosaic or
chorus of ideas.
The contemporary appropriation of Adorno by Jacques Rancière has done much to turn
attention away from, or at least color our perception of, Adorno on the basis of Rancière’s
argument that Adorno’s work—specifically his aesthetics—is detached and aloof from
experience. In Aesthetics and Its Discontents (2009), Rancière characterizes Adorno’s aesthetics
as “maintaining the gap between the dissensual form of the work [of art] and the forms of
ordinary experience.”127 In short, Adorno’s aesthetics are here perceived as being predicated on a
“refusal” of the “mundane world” through his critical affirmation of the non-identical dimension
of modern art.128 Rancière will use the following line of Adorno’s to sum up his aesthetics: “The
social function of Art…is to not have one.”129 While Rancière here captures a fundamental
dimension of Adorno’s aesthetics, his engagement with Adorno nevertheless reduces his work to
a monolithic aesthetic theory, and thereby abstracts his thought from the historical experience
whence it was formed and gains intelligibility.
To broadly argue that Adorno’s work stands above or against ordinary experience risks
neglecting the central role the concept of experience plays in Adorno’s overall living-thought. As
we have studied, Adorno maintained experience to be both non-identical to philosophical
criticism but also intimately constitutive of the latter. Moreover, Adorno’s broad and sustained
turn to aesthetics and the criticism of modern art was itself undertaken in response to more
general-historical circumstances which presented themselves to Adorno’s own proper
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experience—an experience we have sought to capture hitherto. Rancière further writes that for
Adorno, “[t]he promise [of a reconciled society] is negatively preserved [in the work of art], not
only through the separation between artistic form and other forms of life, but also through the
inner contradiction of this form itself.”130 Thus Rancière concludes that for Adorno, “aesthetic
difference,” i.e., autonomous art’s non-identity to social reality, becomes the “guardian of the
promise.”131 While Adorno doubtless prizes autonomous artworks that are non-identical to social
reality whence semblances of hope flash up like “fireworks,” he did not require the artwork, or
art more generally, to singlehandedly or didactically pave the way for social redemption, as
Rancière intimates here.132 Rather, Adorno understood the task of bringing about a reconciled
society as proper to collective praxis as informed by critical social theory, and vice versa;
modern art—the plenipotentiary of a freedom yet realized—cannot bring about thoroughgoing
social freedom alone.

IV. Reading Adorno (with Benjamin)
Adorno comes to us as not only predigested in his being remote, that is, irrelevant, to our
contemporary moment (such a lack of presence is detectable in his form of writing, specifically
in his mode of address); but we also receive him as brought to a finish, as it were: as myth has it,
the German New Left and their “flower power” quite literally killed him.133 The predigested and
predetermined character of our reception of Adorno thus compels us—as we have undertaken
heretofore—to work our way back into his thought by engaging it immanently. Adorno’s final
works—in particular, his criticisms of the German New Left (the SDS, Marcuse, etc.) and his
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unfinished monograph Aesthetic Theory—represent further retreats into both the strongholds of
theory (in the face of false/bad praxis) and the history of art, respectively. Such retreats bring
about a sense of closure for Adorno (and for first generation Critical Theory more broadly), but
not resignation, as he would stress in his final published essay “Resignation.” Indeed, Adorno’s
avowed identification with theory was hedged and strategic: “The desperate state of affairs, that
the praxis on which everything depends is thwarted,” he argues, “paradoxically affords thinking
the breathing-space which it would practically be criminal not to use.”134 Such an identification
with theory (over and against praxis), which subtends the entirety of Adorno’s corpus—despite
the fact that much of his work thematizes artistic praxis—is not comparable, again, to the
Heideggerian or post-Heideggerian turns to thinking, which were undertaken for different
motives that we do not have space to explore here.
From his early work to his late work, Adorno will often remark upon the this-sidedness
and insufficiency of criticism and theory:
[…] criticism cannot take comfort in its own idea.
Dialectic reaches the insight that the closed process also includes the non-included. It
thus reaches a boundary to knowledge itself. Dialectical theory itself would only be
surpassed by transforming praxis.
The interpretation of given reality and its abolition are connected to each other, not, of
course, in the sense that reality is negated in the concept, but that out of the construction
of a configuration of reality the demand for [reality’s] real change always follows
promptly. The change-causing gesture of the riddle process—not its mere resolution as
such—provides the image of resolutions to which materialist praxis alone has access…
mere thought by itself cannot accomplish this: therefore the annihilation of the question
compels praxis. 135
As these passages evidence, the avowed this-sidedness of theory becomes the pivot from
which Adorno’s work opens onto that which exceeds it. The twin status of ‘theory’ as a
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delimited field and ‘praxis’ as a limit-concept of alterity in Adorno’s corpus comes into high
relief in his late work (e.g., “Resignation,” “Marginalia to Theory and Praxis,” etc. (1969)),
much of which was informed by his complex critical engagement with the German New Left.
Even though the German New Left later dismissed him, Adorno’s works and pedagogy upon his
return to post-WWII West Germany were both profoundly instrumental in bringing the former to
the world-historical stage. Thus while business-as-usual for Adorno is immanent dialectical
criticism, in the moments where his work remarks upon itself (as theory or criticism, for
instance), his corpus opens onto more general-historical trajectories that transpire behind the
back of the manifest content of his writings: for our interests here, the trajectory he terms
“historical praxis.”136 In light of this dual nature of Adorno’s writing (latent/manifest), it seems
vital to attempt to futher unravel and explore his ambivalences, in other words, to continue
mining the enigmatic and cryptic character of both Adorno as a figure and his difficult corpus.
Recent research that has brought the works of Benjamin and Adorno together has
revealed the double enunciation (or what Jean-Luc Nancy would call “compearance”) of
Benjamin with(in) Adorno.137 Indeed more broadly, engaging both thinkers simultaneously can
serve as a gateway to clarifying the proper contents and physiognomies of each of their
challenging life-works. Adorno, for one, anticipated how his work was and could increasingly
become potentially obscure and esoteric, and so strove to counteract this tendency. While
Benjamin’s corpus is arguably more gnomic and rarified than the former’s (and thus more apt to
be freely interpreted and abused), Adorno’s work—while also cryptic in its own right—is able
nevertheless to remark more explicitly upon its own potential obscurity and difficulty on account
of a palpable presence of Adorno as critic and Adorno as author in much of his work.
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The difference in authorial presence between the two writers is not coincidental but
points to the discorrespondence of their methods, their respective historical experiences and their
differing understandings of critique. With regard to the last, Benjamin is primarily interested in
immanent critique whereas Adorno tends to engage simultaneously in both transcendent critique
(“aims at totality”/“call[s] culture as a whole into question from outside”) and immanent critique
(“presupposes the questionable whole” and “confront[s] [culture] with the norms it itself has
crystallized”).138
Seldom in Benjamin’s work—his letter correspondences aside—does he openly or
confessionally “put his cards on the table” (Adorno, Negative Dialectics), that is, to explicitly
unfold his philosophical methodology, or unequivocally claim, for instance, to “submit
himself…to the authority of the materialist dialectic” (Adorno, “The Idea of Natural History”).139
Benjamin as author tends to be phenomenologically hidden from his corpus; and this, we can
glean, was of methodological interest to Benjamin, whose styles of citation, montage and
presentation seek to give birth to the critical reader. In his eulogistic “Portrait of Walter
Benjamin,” Adorno spoke to the general opacity and invisibility of Benjamin, in terms of both
his personal character and temperament and also in terms of his status as ‘author’ of the work
and research he produced during his life. This is not the least reason why the vast letter
correspondence between Benjamin and his various interlocutors seems essential when not only
looking for the author ‘behind’ the mercurial and fragmentary corpus Benjamin bequeathed but
also when attempting to achieve an exhaustive and unconditional reading of Benjamin that tends
toward systematic comprehension. 140 It is in light of these hermeneutical difficulties that both the
practice and study of letter writing becomes, as Stefan Müller-Doohm puts it, “an aid to
138
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philosophical self-clarification”—for both ourselves and the writers we are striving to
understand.141
The difference in vocal presence of both thinkers does not betray the above textual
typologies. For instance, Benjamin’s radio talks present yet another ‘new’ Benjamin no one has
heard before, whereas the transcripts of Adorno’s radio talks—as well as his recorded
discussions with Horkheimer (which Gretel Adorno painstakingly transcribed along with many
other Adorno-dictated manuscripts, as the men carried on as usual142)—only make what is unsaid
and latent in Adorno’s texts become more legible. In speech, Adorno is more forthright and less
authorially evasive: “We have to express ourselves in such a way that our readers can see quite
clearly how things have to be changed, but one must allow the reader to see enough to enable
him to glimpse the idea that change is possible.”143 Upon the publication of the English
translation of Adorno’s Critical Models, containing many of his radio talks, the book was praised
as “a more accessible Adorno to the public.”144 By contrast, speaking Benjamin in the recently
published Radio Benjamin (2014) is still mercurial as ever.
Adorno is forced to shore up the protean character of Benjamin’s thinking in order to—
however ambivalently—preserve him and integrate his work into his own comparatively more
programmatic thinking. While Adorno’s appropriation and reconfiguration of Benjamin’s
method of immanent criticism (developed in the latter’s 1924 study of Goethe’s Elective
Affinities and the Trauerspiel) is an act of self-comprehension apropos Benjamin, this endeavor
doubtless sacrifices the unboundedness of Benjamin’s thought. (This is revealed, for instance, in
the way in which praxis-bound anarchist thought is less amenable to Adorno’s avowedly Marxist
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thinking than it is to Benjamin’s thought, the latter who never firmly settled on any hermeneutic
keys.) Indeed, by extracting a method out of his thought, Adorno’s transmutation of Benjamin
may be lamented as an ossifying of Benjamin’s protean thought into the comparatively more
systematic thrust of Critical Theory.145 Yet on the other hand, Benjamin’s thought may be seen
as only becoming strategic when framed by Adorno’s transcendental elevation of the former’s
practice into a method. Nevertheless, it is only by finding Benjamin in Adorno that the latter can
be read immanently, as we are attempting here. Thus we may see Adorno’s shoring up of
Benjamin’s experimental, shape-shifting and unconditional thinking as the repressed condition of
possibility for the explicit and implicit programs of Critical Theory and negative dialectics (to
leave aside other originary figures such as Simmel, Kracauer, Bloch, et al., who are deemed by
Adorno as insufficiently dialectical).
And yet Adorno’s oeuvre, in its own right, is as equally unconditional and audacious as
Benjamin’s and, further, resonates more with the contemporary social situation of academia.
Benjamin has been dubbed the last European man of letters, although he never held an academic
post; Adorno, on the other hand, was more thoroughly entrenched within academia. Benjamin
lived nomadically and never had the institutional, much less financial, security afforded to
Adorno, although the latter’s life was of course not without precarity.146 While Adorno’s corpus
therefore needs to be assessed as being colored by its institutionality (literally, The Institute for
Social Research) it must also be approached with an eye to its undeniable claims to extrainstitutionality. Indeed, Adorno is able to transcend his putatively ‘academic’ status and
emplotment by means of a form of interdisciplinary research and writing that gestically engages
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a mosaic of empirical-scientific and critical-speculative discourses and forms of criticism, which
combine to make up a veritable prism.

V. Dialectic of Retrieval
One reason why we are drawn to Adorno’s thought is due to its unconditional
interdisciplinarity whose critical power entices us to take it up for the critique of contemporary
social phenomena.147 In taking up his work, we find ourselves standing amidst a stream of
discontinuous traditions, narratives and critical models, all of whose afterlives, as a function of
historical change, compel us to receive them critically and reconfigure them immanently via
historical metacritique. In brief, Adorno’s work is compelling because it makes possible the
cohabitation of a manifold of critical models whose nexus one a priori inhabits when engaging
his thought.148 What is at stake in receiving Adorno’s work is thus not only the digestion of
historical experience as such but also the transmissibility and interpenetration of modes of
critique for this very activity of digestion.
The interdisciplinarity of Adorno’s thought does not result in or stem from a colonizing
gesture. Rather, each lens of Adorno’s prism gains potential authority—its plausibility for being
meaningful and potentially ‘true’—by means of an eloquence that is born of its own selfreflexivity and submission (i.e., object-dependence) to ‘history,’ the latter grasped as both the
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transmission of emphatic and critical experiences (in the service of self-determining social
freedom), and ‘history’ also as the unfolding of a historically determinate but alien immanent
necessity: collective unfreedom under capitalist modernity. It is in this sense that Adorno’s
concept of immanent dialectical criticism is modeled on Marx’s dialectical critique of ‘capital,’
which Marx discerned as simultaneously opening up and closing off possibilities: post-capitalist
society and social regression, respectively. It should be appropriately stressed that Marx’s
interests were not anti-capitalist per se. Rather Marx sought to transcend capitalism, as Lenin put
it, on its own basis, from within—to “build socialism,” Lenin writes, “not with abstract human
material, or with human material specially prepared by us, but with the human material
bequeathed to us by capitalism.”149
Adorno’s prismatic and metacritical engagement with a manifold of discursive traditions
and models of critique explores the conditions of im/possibility for the discontinuous continuity
of the various modern discursive traditions he inherits, as well as their speculative intermingling
into a differentiated chorus. The underlying gesture/thought-figure common to the various
conditions of im/possibility explored by Adorno—for instance, the im/possibility of emphatic
artistic praxis and aesthetic experience (Aesthetic Theory), or the im/possibility of philosophy
and metaphysical (nonsensuous) experience (Negative Dialectics))—is that of selfcomprehension, which almost always means for Adorno, historical or sedimentary selfcomprehension. Yet if this gesture seeks to engage and sustain, there is also a temporal spacing
or distancing immanent to this thought-figure whose guiding impulse is that of recovery and
retrieval. (Note should be made here of the family resemblance between Adorno’s thought and
Freudian psychoanalysis, which can be broadly understood as a form of psycho-linguistic self-
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comprehension.150) Self-comprehension—or what we might variously term a certain dialectic of
retrieval—entails the recovery of the origin of a critical experience and the uncovering of how
this origin persists, insofar as its immanent truth content is not only pertinent and eloquent but
also has a claim on the present that demands its liquidation through belated fulfillment, in other
words, its redemption.
By invoking the origin of the critical experience from which a critical model issues,
Adorno is able to free a critical model and its concepts from their binding force of cathexiscompulsion and self-preservation; the subsequent employment of de-cathected/-reified critical
models and their concepts will have direct consequences for questions concerning the
presentation (Darstellung) and arrangement of interdisciplinary criticism. Insofar as “concepts
become available for an association as they are associated in the object itself,” constellation—
instead of linear reasoning—becomes an alternative form of critical presentation and writing by
means of which ideas, concepts and phenomena can be associated on the basis of affinity,151 as
Benjamin would first emphatically explore in the Trauerspiel. 152 In a letter from 1941, Adorno
would express to Horkheimer how their shared philosophical reflections were “gestures taken
from concepts,” but for which “the whole labour of conceptualization” was nevertheless
demanded.153
The gestic and citational character of what we are calling the politics of experience
operative in the works of Benjamin and Adorno—within which historical experience is
sedimented—rests upon an unrestricted practice of collecting critical experiences, which the
construction of constellations then goes beyond by means of an allegorical apprehension of these
150
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experiences.154 Indeed, collecting operates by means of a freedom to choose that falls outside the
perennial, historically determinate ebb and flow of the circulation of commodities and their
attendant subjective consumption. The active collecting of critical experiences, thereby implying
their self-comprehension, in turn makes possible the digestion and transmissibility of such
experiences elsewhere. Occasioned here is thus the question of how history—taken as a mosaic
of ‘past’ experiences—is transmissible in and through language and writing: the proper spacetimes where, following Benjamin, dialectical images can be conjured and where questions of
presentation, form and method obtain.
What we might call Adorno’s modernism, which is integral to his pre-politics, operates
on a certain critical experience of history that is registered immanently through the various
histories of modern literature, art, politics, philosophy, psychology, etc. What is at stake in these
trajectories are precedents for capturing specific-singular and general-recursive aesthetic and
extra-aesthetic crises under capitalist modernity. To be sure, the general and perennial character
of many of these crises accounts for why we encounter Adorno endlessly returning to certain
texts, figures and thought-figures throughout his corpus. Robert Hullot-Kentor, for one, has
rightfully queried “whether Adorno’s prismatic use of concepts successfully escaped…the sum
total of its origins.”155
In the emergent history of modernist literature, for instance, the works of Baudelaire,
Flaubert and Rimbaud become nexes of singular and protracted social-political crises and the
corresponding subjective forms that register and express these crises on the level of experience;
more precisely, on the level of aesthetic-literary praxis.156 The Hegelian program for modern
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literature Lukács would advance in Theory of the Novel (1915) is echoed by Benjamin in the
opening to his essay “The Image of Proust” and would fittingly serve as a maxim for Adorno’s
own modernism: “It has rightly been said that all great works of literature establish a genre or
dissolve one—that they are, in other words, special cases.”157 Riven with rupture, the history of
modernism thus becomes an unavowable tradition that can nevertheless be read as a continuous
“history of determinate negations.”158 Extrapolating on the critical work of Pierre Jean Jouve,
Adorno would trace in “Valéry’s Deviations” how the literary works of Rimbaud, Mallarmé,
Valéry, Surrealism, Proust, et al., all emerged—to varying degrees—out of the left-wing and
right-wing aesthetic and political tendencies latent in Baudelaire, to whom they would stand as
immanent reconfigurations.159
Reencountering Adorno’s modernism in extremis, which developed within the period
Hobsbawm terms “the short twentieth century” (1914–1991) but which crests before the
paradigms of post-modernism and -structuralism and the global transformations of neoliberalism
took hold (being cut short by Adorno’s death in 1969), offers us the occasion to revisit the
question and problem of critique and explore its conditions of im/possibility, given what we may
now identify as a certain “stagnation” or exhaustion of Critical Theory that Habermas and
Sloterdijk were among the first to register.160 This exhaustion has now, in the 21st century, been
codified by contemporary thinkers such as Jacques Rancière, who has done much to challenge
and think through Adorno’s cul-de-sac. Following Sloterdijk, it would seem that the Adornian
project of Critical Theory—which for our purposes here can be broadly defined as the expression
counter-science constituting “a perpetual principle of dissatisfaction” against the human sciences (Foucault, The
Order of Things, 373).
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of contemporary antinomies and the “becom[ing-] conscious of the history immanently
sedimented in them”—has all but run out of steam.161 And yet Critical Theory has not liquidated
itself; for to do so would mean making-obsolescent the ‘past’ need that gave rise to the
emergence and apparent necessity of Critical Theory, which was none other than the failed and
since abandoned overcoming of capitalist society and the struggle for what Marx called
proletarian socialism, an overcoming—the possibility of a post-capitalist, emancipated form of
social life—which the historically specific, dialectical dynamic of capital simultaneously
engenders and constrains. To be sure, now well into the 21st century, it is self-evident that
nothing about critique—to invoke the Adornian refrain—can be taken for granted as self-evident.
Engaging Adorno, whose corpus conveniently marks off a historical epoch, makes possible a
certain disattachment from many of the post-‘60s/New Left discontents and concerns that now
preoccupy contemporary 21st century discourses and practices. For this reason, however, such a
disattachment could be perceived as untimely or worse, irresponsible; as an unnecessary
engagement with a ‘bygone’ figure. Yet insofar as the Left appears persistently plagued by its
own disseminated problematics, returning to Adorno proves to be a timely endeavor.

VI. “Nothing New Under The Sun”
What remained theoretically inadequate in Hegel and Marx became part of historical
praxis; that is why it is to be theoretically reflected upon anew, instead of thought bowing
irrationally to the primacy of praxis; this was itself an eminently theoretical concept.
—Adorno162
It goes without saying at our historical juncture that there is no self-evident line leading
beyond capitalist society; nor is there, as we will explore in the fourth chapter, a clear or obvious
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remedy for anthropogenic global warming. There is, however, a road leading back into bourgeois
society which makes possible an intensification of a project of freedom that has yet to be
liquidated: a task registered, however variously, by radical bourgeois figures such as Rousseau,
Kant, Hegel, Marx, et al. As we have noted, the capacity for and possibility of othering the world
is alienated and in ruins. Hence the productivity of tracing the antinomies that emerge out of the
breakdown of the emphatic, but in no way unproblematic (and hence in need of metacritical and
immanent reconfiguration), task of freedom that is varyingly hallucinated in the radical
bourgeois philosophy and political economy of Rousseau, Adam Smith, et al; the Enlightenment
philosophy of Kant; the post-Enlightenment philosophy of Hegel; and the so-called “Second
Enlightenment” of Marx and Engels—all of which find their afterlives, as Adorno argues, in
“historical praxis.”163
Adorno, “the last defender of the bourgeois tradition against the horrors of the 20th
century”—and also simultaneously its premier critic and undertaker—stands as a signpost to this
radical bourgeois lineage.164 At the same time, his work also stands as a cipher for understanding
the difficulty of receiving and making good on the tasks handed down by this tradition. Running
counter to our own attempt to receive the messages Adorno bequeathed and the figures whose
thought he sustains, we are confronted with the Benjaminian-Adornian discourse on the decay
and resultant im/possibility of emphatic (metaphysical/nonsensuous) experience; a registered
fragmentation of experience under late-capitalist modernity that may in fact prevent us from
inheriting these veritable messages. In short, this is the thesis of the historical disintegration and
synchronic sliding of experience, the latter finding expression in apperceptive distractedness,
reified disinterestedness, etc.
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The possibility of “the new” (“the dialectically produced”), the possibility that something
beyond the eternal return of the same under late-capitalist society can appear, is an indirect
concern of Freudian psychoanalysis and an explicit problematic for Adornian negative dialectics,
which philosophically engages and immanently reconfigures Freudian psychoanalysis under
changed historical conditions.165 Like psychoanalytic practice and theory, Adorno’s work also
shares a “fundamental practical orientation toward freedom,” for which the new is its discursive
index.166 Yet while the desideratum is no doubt the new, everywhere Adorno’s texts are weighed
down with the old, the ever-same and ‘nature’ in the critical Hegelian sense of the “mere
reproduction of what has already been.”167
The liminality of the limit-concept of “the new” in Adorno’s corpus, moreover, the fact
that any and all positive images of the future and a reconciled society are tabooed except for the
negative images refracted through immanent critique, reflects and is mimetic of the
im/possibility of the emergence of the new.168 Indeed, as we will soon explore, Adorno’s corpus
may itself even be characterized as natural-historical; as submissive to history as an apparently
“natural force in which one is constantly being carried along.”169 In Adorno’s historical
metacritiques and in his own programmatic works proper, the “weight of history” effectuates
“the transmutation of metaphysics into history”: “It secularizes metaphysics,” he writes, “into the
secular category pure and simple, that of decay.”170 As, for instance, in his so-called metacritique
of Husserl, Adorno argues that in the former’s hands, “the decaying concepts of epistemology
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point beyond themselves”; such concepts are “a bit of unconscious transcription of history. For
they must be helped to procure self-consciousness against that which they explicitly mean.”171
The imputed weighty and intransigent character of Adorno’s work may thus be seen as pointing
to and rendering legible the object of dialectical critique and its sedimented history of failed selfovercomings. However, to portray Adorno’s thought as natural-historical is not to say that his
thinking is devoid of plasticity or openness.
The intransigence of Adorno’s thought has rarely been seen positively or as meriting
much historico-philosophical interest. Instead, it is typically lamented or even derided in favor of
new models of critique that, even within the hermetic walls of academia, bear the phantasmatic
traces of the commodity character in their desublimated embraces of the new and the different,
which of course in any emphatic or robust sense social reality categorically denies. Sloterdijk has
characterized such intransigence as an “a priori pain” and “crypto-Buddhist spirit” that suffuses
Adorno’s work.172 Sloterdijk’s own call to loosen up the mood of philosophy—to engage in a
“new critique of temperaments,” instead of picking up the phone where Adorno left off—bars us
from considering the potential use and productivity of Adorno’s so-called a priori pain.173
Indeed, what Sloterdijk ends up abjuring in Adorno by pathologizing his thought is arguably
what is productive and of historical interest in Adorno. If it was “astonishing” to Adorno “how
few traces of human suffering one notices in the history of philosophy,” then the inverse
proposition could be directed at his own work.174 Such a philosophical submission to history, for
which Hegel is Adorno’s proper forbearer,175 raises the question of to what, if anything,
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philosophy should not be receptive.
The avowed intrusion of history into the scene of the writing of philosophy—meaning
now history sets the terms for philosophy (exogenously) and of philosophy (immanently)—is
embraced as early as Adorno’s 1931 inaugural lecture at the University of Frankfurt, “The
Actuality of Philosophy,” where he argues that “only out of the historical entanglement of
questions and answers does the question of philosophy’s actuality emerge precisely.”176 This
encroachment of history upon philosophical discourse is brought to asystematic articulation in
Negative Dialectics, which meditates on what it means to philosophize “after Auschwitz” and in
the wake of the world-historical and political failures of Marxism and the Left, among other
junctures.177
In the Preface to Negative Dialectics and in his Lectures on Negative Dialectics, Adorno
professes that “history” “dictate[s]” the “concern[s] of philosophy.”178 Breaking the spell of what
Freud polemically calls the “omnipotence of thought,” history can thus be said to constitute latemodern philosophy’s proper Ur-text.179 The primacy of history for Adorno’s thought is
demonstrated perhaps most powerfully in the “new categorical imperative” Hitler established: to
“arrange” “unfree mankind’s” “thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so
that nothing similar will happen.”180 Adorno would assume and carry out this imperative most
exhaustively—on levels both psychological and sociological—in his post-WWII writings and
lectures on education and pedagogy. The entanglement of history in Adorno’s work thus gives
birth to his corpus’ persistent deadlocks and accumulated problematics. Hence the productivity
of engaging his corpus as a whole rather than as a series of disarticulated studies, essays and
176
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books: this is an attention to the ‘whole’ that Adorno’s writings on music, for instance, inculcate
in the experience of listening to music.
Given what we have identified as the encroachment of history upon his thought and the
resultant sedimentation of historical experience (which anyone’s life unavoidably bears under
capitalist society), what space is there, if any, for spontaneity and play in the work of Adorno?
Certainly for Adorno, “[s]pontaneity appears to be trivial at the outset in the face of the factual
supremacy of the objective conditions.”181 Perhaps if there is spontaneity and experimentation in
Adorno’s thought it is achieved through what we have heretofore identified as his unconditional
engagement with a manifold of empirical and critical-speculative discourses. A certain margin of
play is also arrived at through the aesthetic and paratactical dimensions of his prose, which
Hullot-Kentor has captured most concisely and forcefully. Such prose, we might say, sublimates
the creative drive through a form of critical, multidisciplinary writing that reflexively expresses
its own social unfreedom whence negative images of an emancipated world issue; not unlike that
of Schoenberg’s music.182
To be committed to engaging Adorno’s work is to sense that the past outweighs and
molds the present and future tenses, and yet to also have an attendant, countervailing desire to
inhabit the nexus of this weighty past with the desire for emphatic newness. In Adorno’s work,
dialectical critique serves as the immanent channel between these two seemingly isomorphic
poles that are in disagreement: on the one hand, a weighty past, and on the other, emphatic
newness. Perhaps what we are so resistant to in Adorno’s work, that is, what is experienced as
disagreeable in his thinking and on the level of his text, is the weightiness of history as an
emplotment of unfreedom that we continue to share and identify with. It is this ‘insufferable’
181
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tarrying with the past that culminates in Sloterdijk’s declaration of the apparent dead-end of
Adornian Critical Theory which operates in a supposed “crypto-Buddhist spirit.”183
A politics or poetics of novelty would seemingly overcome this persistent cathexis of the
past by opting for a spatial rather than a temporal model of criticism. By thinking spatially, as it
were, the present is made available as not being weighed down by the past; a poetics of novelty,
of how something new can emerge, can now be theorized without reference to the burden of
historical weightedness. With this emphasis on spatiality, however, we lose an attunement to
sedimentation; and thus we continue to sense that time overdetermines space—and are quickly
drawn back to a poetics of tarrying.184 Perhaps what is perceived as ‘wrong’ in Adorno’s work—
i.e., what is democratically called out by the reader of Adorno and protested against—is the
tarrying, the remarking upon historical sedimentation which of course Adorno is in disagreement
with as well via criticism. We may broadly characterize or think of the intransigence of Adorno’s
thought in terms of a form of submission to the preponderance of nature—in the Hegelian sense
of the ever-same, and the Kantian realm of unfreedom/necessity—as opposed to that of
becoming and self-overcoming.
This intransigence of historical experience, subsumed immanently into philosophical
writing, has made possible our metacritical reading of Adorno hitherto, which seeks to speak
speculatively of Adorno’s corpus, that is, tout court. To be sure, the historical experience proper
to Adorno’s oeuvre does not consist of the fragmentary experiences that Lukács’s History and
Class Consciousness, in giving further phenomenal form to Marx’s Capital, would capture as
normative under conditions of late-capitalist modernity. Instead, historical experience here
183
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accumulates via a process of sedimentation, a concept Adorno uses to express a fraught nondialectic of being and becoming, of continuity and change: “everything new is weaker than the
accumulated ever-same, and it is ready to regress back into it.”185
It has become common to read what Richard Wolin, along with many others,186 has
identified as Adorno’s “remarkable continuity,” which spans nearly four decades, as stemming
from a certain obstinacy or inflexibility of his thinking: what Sloterdijk, for one, has lamented as
Adorno’s “defensive thinking.”187 As Sloterdijk argues, “[p]olitically, and in its nerve endings,
this aesthetic, this ‘sensitive’ theory [of Adorno’s], is based on a reproachful attitude, composed
of suffering, contempt, and rage against everything that has power.”188 The sensitivity and
receptivity of Adorno’s thought, coupled with its consistency, makes Adorno’s corpus something
of a living-thought that can be addressed in its totality; as Barthes will similarly remark vis-à-vis
Beethoven, “[his oeuvre’s] readability feeds on a sort of totality of the artist,” that is, a totality or
consistency already immanent to Beethoven’s oeuvre proper.189 To grasp the former ‘whole’
means traversing the disparate works of Adorno’s corpus in order to contemplate its entirety, an
aesthetic and critical experience that Adorno himself understood as having become increasingly
impossible, for instance, in the experience of the ‘whole’ of a work of art. Of course the danger
here is that of hijacking ‘Adorno’ as a totality, as a potentially reified object, and thereby making
him amenable to various programmatic interests, such as academic leftist imperatives.
The continuity of Adorno’s thought has typically been cast negatively, influenced not the
least by his infamous critical engagement with the ‘60s German New Left which saw his
intransigence as an obstacle—a perception captured here by Sloterdijk:
185
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To remain sensitive was, as it were, a Utopian stance—to keep the senses sharpened for a
happiness that will not come, a stance that nevertheless, by being prepared for happiness,
protects us from the worst kind of brutalizations…In this sensitive critique, there is a
paralyzing resentment…Adorno’s theory revolted against the collaborative traits
embedded in the ‘practical attitude.’190
To be sure, the perceived obstinacy of Adorno’s thought tends to be read as reflecting
Adorno’s temperament (what Sloterdijk calls Adorno’s “emotional a priori”; a supposed
regulative “concept of the Sensitive”) instead of his object.191 From the side of the object, such
intransigence can be construed as productive in that it makes legible not only emphatic historical
experience but also history in its discontinuous continuity. What we have captured above as the
cathectically overdetermined character of Adorno’s work—which would seem to pose problems
for the plasticity and responsiveness of his thinking to the singularity of the present—also makes
possible its dense, rich, and often powerful character, insofar as critical-historical experience is
thereby congealed in his writings. The textual presence of such historical experience, however, is
not accidental but rather stems from the privileged status accorded to experience in his thinking;
more precisely, the function of a philosophical concept of experience operative in his work, for
which, as we will soon explore, Adorno is indebted to Benjamin.
What appears as the obstinacy of Adorno’s thought is also bound up with the anxiety of
his thinking in the face of social regression. For instance, Adorno took pains to memorialize,
disseminate, and critically sustain Benjamin’s work, a life-long activity witnessed most
poignantly in his eulogistic and archival essays on Benjamin (“Introduction to Benjamin’s
Schriften”; “Benjamin the Letter Writer,” etc.). For Adorno, the historical trajectory that had
issued from Benjamin’s death in 1940 endangered the very preservation and survival of his
critical thought. Adorno’s labors to sustain Benjamin’s work point—however indirectly—to his
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broader understanding of the social tendency of regression, a concept Adorno critically borrowed
from psychoanalytic discourse and practice.

VII. Conclusion
Given Adorno’s preoccupation with this tendency and the societal lapses into barbarism
he witnessed during his life, we might push back here on Jacob Taubes’ excoriating reading of
the “Finale” of Adorno’s Minima Moralia, which leads him to attack Adorno for being an
“aesthete,” without recognizing the historical valences of the work’s closing aphorism—the
beginning and end of which read:
The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in the face of despair is the
attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of
redemption…But beside the demand thus placed on thought, the question of the reality or
unreality of redemption itself hardly matters.192
What Taubes takes to be Adorno’s “aestheticization of the problem” of redemption here
we might conversely see as Adorno’s willful and self-conscious critical objectification of the
obstacle, which is manifest through the conspicuous distance he assumes vis-à-vis
“redemption.”193 While Taubes places emphasis on the irreality of redemption for Adorno—
arguing that Adorno only cares to entertain its virtual possibility but not its actuality—we might
counter this reading by emphasizing that for Adorno here, “the demand…placed on thought” to
strive for social redemption, more precisely, for social transformation, is in fact the only thing
that “matters”; the ‘as-if’ is subordinate to the “besides.”194 In other words, it does not matter
whether we contemplate the reality or unreality of redemption; only the task and struggle
(mutually shared by thought and praxis) to change and thereby redeem the world can be our
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concern. Hence Taubes’ Benjaminian critique of Adorno, which approaches him from the
standpoint of critical-hermeneutical theology, misses what is critically and historically at stake in
Adorno’s gnomic aphorism. Indeed, Adorno’s “Finale” (and much of his work more generally)
remarks upon how critical thought itself––the condition of possibility for social transformation,
through its non-identity with social being—is in danger of being eclipsed by a regressive social
totality which has subsumed forcible, dialectical opposition to capitalist society and thereby
perniciously molds society on levels both sociological and psychological by and large
unchecked. Thus, as Adorno’s work seems to intimate, perhaps Benjamin’s philosophy of
immanence is no longer tenable on account of the post-history of Benjamin’s work, which the
latter could not have anticipated.
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3. On the Convergence of Natural History and a Philosophical Concept
of Experience
To the eternity of the historical moment
there corresponds an attitude which sees the
way of the world as naturally fallen and
invariant; the moment, the absolutely
transient, is the likeness of the eternity of
passing away, of damnation.—Adorno195

Through the lens of Adorno’s own engagements with the idea of natural history
(Naturgeschichte),196 his thought, I will argue, can itself be understood as natural-historical,
tending toward sedimentation rather than self-overcoming, which in turn reflects the
intransigence of the object of critique more than his thought itself. In his 1932 lecture “The Idea
of Natural History,” containing, as Hullot-Kentor has noted, “the central elements of Adorno’s
mature works,” Adorno would assimilate Benjamin’s Trauerspiel for the program of his own
immanent dialectical criticism.197 Grasping the ambiguities and conceptual slippages immanent
to the idea of natural history, Adorno understands the idea’s constitutive concepts of ‘nature’ and
‘history’ as not only mutually determining but as also providing the key for demystifying each
other’s ‘necessary forms of appearance.’198 Adorno would thus employ the concepts of nature
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and history in much the same way as the early Lukács in order to break open the ideological
fusion of nature and history that congeals in social phenomena and results in a reified second
nature. The task Adorno set forth, Hullot-Kentor clarifies, was to “comprehend an object as
natural where it appears most historical and as historical where it appears most natural.”199 This
particular usage of the idea of natural history—which has a long history of mirror-stage like
uses200—as a critical concept is also encountered in the Arcades Project, where Benjamin
establishes “the axiom” “to avoid mythic thinking”: “No historical category without natural
substance; no natural substance without its historical filter.”201
For Adorno, the idea of natural history may be best understood as a certain “dialectical
way of seeing” that attempts to comprehend history (ostensibly the domain of transformation and
becoming) “in its eternal and total passing away,” and thereby grasp the natural in the
historical.202 (And here it seems auspicious to draw the family resemblance between Adorno and
Benjamin’s shared “thanatological model of interpretation” and Lenin’s ideas of the withering
away of the state and the overcoming of bourgeois right. As Benjamin writes in a moment that
inevitably evokes Lenin, “nature is Messianic by reason of its eternal and total passing away. To
strive after such passing, even for those stages of man that are nature, is the task of world
politics, whose method must be called nihilism.”203) “For radical natural-historical thought,”
Adorno writes, “everything existing” (under capitalist modernity) “transforms itself into ruins
and fragments.”204 To be sure, natural history would prove to be an idea that permeated Adorno’s
thought; for instance, he would identify the task of the essay—critical to its core—as striving to
“seek the eternal in the transient and distill it out; [the essay] tries to render the transient
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eternal.”205
Looking to “dialectically overcome the usual antithesis of nature and history” that
animates large swaths of post-Kantian intellectual history, Adorno formulates, following
Benjamin, what might be called a weak relation between nature and history that can be
contrasted against the tangled and mediative relation between spirit (Geist) and nature in Hegel,
and the rift encountered between freedom and nature in Kant’s idealism.206 In his early 1918
essay “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy,” Benjamin had announced his desire to
“abolish” the “distinction between the realms of nature and freedom” in Kant’s architectonic
philosophy.207 Contesting this dichotomy, however, did not mean synthesizing or collapsing
these two realms; rather Benjamin argued that “[a]nother relation between thesis and antithesis is
possible besides synthesis.”208 Within the context of this essay, he would ultimately advocate
(however vaguely) for “a certain nonsynthesis of two concepts in another.”209 Samuel Weber
explains how, for this early Benjamin, thesis and antithesis (here, the Kantian spheres of freedom
and nature) are to be brought together “in a relation that would not be subsumptive or reductive
of their constitutive differences.”210 While Benjamin perhaps unwittingly repeated the Hegelian
point of departure in advocating for a speculative rethinking of Kant (that seeks to dialectically
mediate (neo-)Kantian antinomies), his early metacritique of Kant and Neo-Kantianism also
represents what Osborne and Matthews have called “an attempt to construct an alternative postKantian tradition to that of Hegelian dialectics.”211 Such a vertitable alternative is forged through
Benjamin’s early formulations of constellation (a “nonsynthesis of two concepts in another”) and
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his embrace of aesthetic experience as a capacious and quasi-mediative nexus between the
otherwise antinomic or reified (post-)Kantian spheres of freedom (moral-political reason) and
nature/unfreedom (experience).212
As Beatrice Hanssen explicates, by suggesting history and nature were “commensurable”
in “the moment of transience that befell both” Adorno saw Benjamin as challenging the
“customary antithesis of nature and history” found in the German Idealist fissure between nature
and freedom/history.213 Adorno would also embrace Benjamin’s idea of natural history as a
challenge to Hegel’s idealist philosophy of history and as a corrective to the idealist trappings of
phenomenology, the latter of which Adorno argued exhibited a constitutive “blindness to
history.”214 The idea of natural history pointed to an “originary unity” and dialectical
interpenetration between nature and history (rather than a rift), whose common origin was that of
an originary transience.215 By emphasizing the transient and the process of decay that marked
history, Hanssen explains how Adorno perceived Benjamin as “initiat[ing] the turn to another
form of history, one no longer idealist in nature.”216
Bringing Lukács’ Theory of the Novel and Benjamin’s Trauerspiel into dialogue, Adorno
argues both texts share the same endeavor of transvaluing nature and the natural, and thereby not
only call into question any idea of a “primary substance or arche” but also challenge the ‘vulgar’
philosophical concept of nature as simple “originary immediacy.”217 While Lukács demonstrated
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the transformation of history into nature, resulting in a second nature (a concept borrowed from
Hegel), Benjamin inversely conceived nature as “transitory nature,” i.e., nature as history.218
Nature is hence no longer understood by Benjamin as “originary immediacy” but as originary
transience, which in turn constitutes original history or archi-history.219 What surfaces in this Urhistory is not nature as such but an originary decay. In revealing the fissure between signification
(the sphere of history) and nature, Benjamin’s critical use of allegory in the Trauerspiel thereby
exposes how “nature bears the imprint of history.”220 Like nature, history in Benjamin’s hands
also loses its organicity and self-sameness; in becoming entwined with nature it becomes
“nature-history.”221

I. Pharamakon of Natural History
Adorno’s appropriation of Benjamin’s multivalent idea of natural history222 entails the
philosophical assimilation of the concepts of transience, decay and disintegration; concepts
which had, according to Adorno, been historically “downgrade[d]” (ontotheologically) by the
Western philosophical tradition and considered “neglible.”223 Adorno’s concern for such themata
would reappear programmatically in his late work Negative Dialectics where he argued in the
Introduction that “the matters of true philosophical interest at this point in history are those in
which Hegel, agreeing with tradition, expressed his disinterest.”224 Here he would also cite
“nonconceptuality, individuality and particularity” as additional concepts that needed to be
218
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integrated into philosophical thinking and discourse by means of a capacious, indeed “spiritual”
(geistige), concept of philosophical experience.225 In so doing, Adorno tacitly acknowledges his
assimilation of Benjamin’s unconditional project of widening the philosophical concept of
experience, which served as the grounds for Benjamin’s later explorations of the idea of natural
history.
In his 1918 metacritique of Kant and the contemporaneous Neo-Kantianism of his milieu,
Benjamin argued that while Kant had been able to address the “question of knowledge that is
lasting,” Kant’s epistemology had been unable to adequately address “the integrity of an
experience that is ephemeral.”226 Benjamin accounted for this blindness by exposing how Kant
had constructed his philosophy upon the “naked, primitive, self evident” Enlightenment concept
of experience, whose paradigm was that of Newtonian physics.227 In this essay, “On the Program
of the Coming Philosophy,” Benjamin consequently announced his intention to expand the
limited spatio-temporal forms and causal-mechanistic categories of Kant’s philosophy through
the integration of religious, artistic, historical, mythical, insane, linguistic, psychological, and
other forms of experience. By incorporating more speculative phenomenological forms of
experience into the arena of philosophical knowledge—for which he would nevertheless
preserve the Kantian “demand for justification”—Benjamin exposed philosophy to experiences,
themata and concerns that it had typically excluded or had not embraced self-consciously, much
less emphatically.228 Such a capacious philosophical receptivity to experience as developed by
Benjamin is programmatically invoked in the Introduction to Adorno’s Negative Dialectics,
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which “expounds the concept of philosophical experience.”229 As Roger Foster has revealed in
Adorno: The Recovery of Experience, “[t]he introduction to Negative Dialectics, which perhaps
more than any other of Adorno’s writings contains the methodological key to his work, had
originally carried the title of ‘a theory of spiritual [geistige] experience.’”230 This capacious
concept of experience not only opens up the space for natural history but also serves as the
condition of possibility for Adorno’s multi- and inter-disciplinary dialectical criticism, which he
undertook in many divergent but interrelated contexts and fields throughout his life.231
The downgraded concepts Benjamin strove to integrate into philosophical thinking, such
as ephemerality, have a distinctly pharmakological effect on Adorno’s corpus. To be sure, ideas
such as allegory and natural history are not imbued with the same negative-theological character
in Adorno’s thought as they are in the early and even the late Benjamin (however allegorical they
may be in the latter’s work). As Richard Wolin has observed, the “ideology-critical moments of
categories such as allegory and natural history,” which find their most proximate origins in
Benjamin’s thought, are divested of their “redemptive significance” in Adorno’s corpus.232 Such
critical moments, Wolin argues, can only be brought to closure via “social praxis” for Adorno.233
Wolin hence appropriately contrasts Adorno’s “purely negative idea of the function of theory”
with that of the (“far removed”) “conception of redemptive criticism” Benjamin undertook in his
early work.234 Lacking the negative-theological dimension of both Benjamin’s early and late
iterations of critique, Adorno is thus forced to look beyond theory proper in order to account for
not only why critical moments cannot be brought to completion via social praxis, but moreover,
why praxis itself is not transformative; or worse, why it has become regressive.
229
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While the ideas Adorno inherited from Benjamin and salvaged from the one-way street of
history open up the space for the healing of accumulated historical suffering and memory
through philosophy, they also, at the same time, further expose philosophy to an ever-steepening
balance-sheet of suffering which tends—as Adorno witnessed, for instance, in the cultural
response to the Holocaust—to only be met with collective amnesia and subjective repression.235
Hence it is as if in Adorno’s work Benjamin’s thought becomes fully secularized and loses its
halo, as Benjamin wrote apropos Baudelaire. In the wake of the horrors of the twentieth century
and upon his return to post-WWII West Germany after his exile in America, Rolf Tiedemann
describes how Adorno “continued in his thinking to reflect upon actual history and the processes
eroding it.”236 Hullot-Kentor similarly writes that “[t]he whole of Adorno’s philosophy…right
through [to] Negative Dialectics, stood before him in this brief talk [“The Idea of Natural
History”] as a capacity to present the reality of history with an unprecedented starkness of
philosophical consciousness.”237 Perhaps nowhere is Adorno’s submission to a regressive (if
minimally progressive) historical process more vividly captured than in his transcribed and
posthumously published lectures, where his faltering voice continually repeats the same central
thought-figures and becomes caught in a ceaseless, tarrying dialectic of retrieval. In a footnote
later appended to Negative Dialectics, Adorno would confess that “[t]he idea of a logic of
disintegration is the oldest of [my] philosophical conceptions, going back to [my] student
years.”238
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II. Conclusion
…the possibility of action in lingering and the promise of freedom in action.—Fred Moten239
Adorno’s corpus, which is arguably more emphatically and classically Marxist than
Benjamin’s, is also decidedly more natural-historical than the latter’s insofar as it more
noticeably bears, on the level of the text, the marks of decay of its object. In other words, and as
we have studied hitherto, natural-historical experience is more conspicuously objectivated and
made-manifest in Adorno’s writings. Heretofore we have encountered such decay in the charted
decline and atrophy of forcible, dialectical forms of opposition to capitalist society (via collective
praxis) and their resultant incapacity, which transpired during Adorno’s lifetime and are
registered in his overall corpus. Through the “allegorical vision” which opens up the space-time
for natural history, Benjamin describes in the Trauerspiel how “all that is human…not only the
nature of human existence in general but the biographical historicity of an individual is
enunciated in this figure [“a death’s head”] of the most extreme subjugation to nature.”240 It is
perhaps in this sense that Adorno’s living-thought may be thought to be subject to ‘nature’: to
transience and decay as a form of original history, and to that which is static or worse,
regressing. After all it is that which does not change, which Adorno called “[t]he other, less
popular aspect of dialectic,” that properly concerns his negative dialectic.241
Thus far we have explored what it might mean to read Adorno’s living-corpus as naturalhistorical in its entire composition, 1931–1969. Further, by framing our engagement with
Adorno through a post-1917 prism, we have also sought to render legible a historical trajectory
that is non-identical to critical reflection, and to study how this exogenous process became
entangled with and is expressed in and through his thinking. Yet aside from maintaining their
239
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non-identity, what is the proper distance—we might ask—to establish towards Adorno’s writing,
on the one hand, and its concomitant concrete historical experience on the other? Of course in
approaching Adorno it seems imperative not to crudely reduce thought to history, or vice versa;
indeed herein lies the modicum of freedom for critical thinking: in the space between history and
experience. And yet through the eyes of Adorno’s own philosophy, as we now know well,
critique frequently appears entirely helpless vis-à-vis an alienated historical dynamic that
continues apace unchecked, insofar as it can only lend critical digestion to its object. It is in this
sense that Moishe Postone’s contemporary thematization of helplessness may be understood as a
faint echo of the post-Adornian disintegration of theory since the post-1917 aftermath—theory
now being exceedingly severed and alienated from praxis.242 As we will study in the coming
chapter, this experience of helplessness resonates with the contemporary experience of ongoing
and future anthropogenic global warming which, along with a manifold of other interlocking
social problematics, stands incapable of being adequately redressed via social praxis.
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4. A Critical Reading of Freedom in the Anthropocene: 20th Century
Helplessness in the Face of Climate Change (2015)

One must insist that transference is the
formal source of the creative processes that
inspire the exodus of humans into the open.
We do not so much transfer incorrigible
affects onto unknown persons as early
spatial experiences to new places, and
primary movements onto remote locations.
—Sloterdijk243

I. An Embrace of Transference
1. Everywhere, even here, environmental politics (praxis that seeks to redress the
perceived environmental crisis244) is being held to a new criterion that syncopates with the
desideratum of the traditional, and now historical, Left: minimally, radical social transformation.
By ‘the Left’ we do not mean to denote a singular, monolithic entity or actually-existing object
but rather a manifold of unresolved antinomies, or dialectics at a standstill, stemming from the
past which animate the present. The Left also notably persists, following Leszek Kolakowski, as
an idea, in the sense of an aggregate or constellation of extremes.245
2. Re: the query of whether there is “any prospect for an ideological unification of
environmentalism and the [desiderata of the] traditional left?” we might argue that, on a
historico-philosophical register, it is already transpiring—perhaps spontaneously and
unconsciously—in response to ongoing and intensifying anthropogenic global warming.246 The
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notion of the allegorical imbrication of these two historico-political trajectories and the
speculative conjunction of their respective messianisms is intimated in the provocative closing
lines of Andrew Feenberg’s essay “Beyond the Politics of Survival” (1979):
The environmental crisis, in short, brings not peace but a sword. And precisely for that
reason it is not a unifying messianic force through which the human race could join in an
ennobling struggle beyond the petty conflicts of history. Rather, it is a new terrain on
which the old, old issues will be fought out, perhaps this time to a conclusion.247
3. While the traditional Left understood surpassing the horizon of socialism, that is,
attaining socialism, as necessitating the determinate negation or self-overcoming of capitalist
society, what it would mean to ‘surpass’ or ‘overcome’ global warming seems much less clear or
straightforward. This lack of clarity will lead us, below, to ask after and query the desiderata of
environmental politics and allegorically constellate the latter with the history of the Left.
4. In both contemporary scientific and social-scientific discourse surrounding climate
change, the emphases (and frequent co-joining) of a) transformation/change (whether passive or
active) and b) the social dimension of global warming (whether exogenous or anthropogenic)
have reached a fever pitch:
a) i) “the problems of political transformation” concern precisely “getting from the
unecological present to an ecological future.”
ii) “The impact of climate change on natural ecosystems and on human society and
economies is potentially severe, ranging from sea level rise and melting ice at higher
latitudes (Arctic and Antarctic) and altitudes (mountain glaciers), to changing weather
patterns characterized by increasingly severe storms, floods and droughts, and the
attendant impacts of these changes.”
iii) “Those societies that respond to environmental and other stresses by transformation
rather than collapse have the capability to question their core values if they become
dysfunctional and to drive fundamental shifts in those values, leading to more adaptive
and resilient societies.”248
b) i) Adequately reckoning with global warming increasingly appears to mean, as
Melathopoulos and Stoner argue in Freedom in the Anthropocene, “taking hold of broad
247
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social processes that are seemingly more complex and incomprehensible than [for
instance,] the dynamic chemical processes and patterns of aerosol movements in the
stratosphere.”
ii) “The emergence of climate change as a central political issue around the world, along
with growing concern for the environment more generally, has raised the challenge to
achieve sustainability as a high order social goal.”
iii) “Today, the possibilities for environmental change have become linked to the
redefinition of the environmental movement and its capacity to transform society itself.”
iv) To be sure, the social dimension of global warming concerns, at its most elementary,
“the very conditions, both biological and geological, on which the survival of human life
as developed in the Holocene period depends.”249

II. The Status of Scientific Research
5. While environmental scientists and sociologists250 alike exhibit the capacity to describe
the crisis in its objectivity and its ‘total’ dimension (for instance, the long-term effects of climate
change, and humanity’s ability to transform the objective character of the world251), a growing
concern for environmental scientists and sociologists is how “rising consciousness of
environmental degradation” (such as increased popular awareness or greater techno-scientific
understanding) does not necessarily lead to, or translate into, ecologically meliorative changes in
humanity’s objective transformation of the world.252 For a veritable chorus of scientists and
sociologists, this contradiction highlights and points to the “runaway” and alien character of
anthropogenic global warming which, by and large, continues apace unchecked.253 As Joern
Fischer, et al. contend (2007), “[d]espite increasing efforts at all levels of society to create a
sustainable future, global-scale indicators show that humanity is moving away from sustainability
rather than towards it”; further, they write that scientists recurringly find that “their actions in the
249
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world end up being frustrated and turn into ‘politically mediated compromises that fall far
short.’”254
Herein we should note that much of the research environmental science produces tends to
lack the capacity for dialectical critique, that is, the ability to point in the direction of its object’s
transformation on the basis of its non-identical immanence to its object. Seeking to bolster the
critical reflexivity of scientific research apropos global warming, Bruno Latour has aptly noted
that “[w]hile the older problem of science studies was to understand the active role of scientists
in the construction of facts, a new problem arises: how to understand the active role of human
agency not only in the construction of facts, but also in the very existence of the phenomena
those facts are trying to document.”255

III. Whence Environmental Politics? (i)
6. In the face of intensifying, unforeseeable (scientific and predictive indeterminacy256)
and (largely) unavowable climate change, the perceived failure257 of environmental politics and
movements—let alone ‘mainstream’ politics, and the imbrication of forms of eco-politics
therein—to adequately bring about the social transformation that now appears increasingly
necessary to mitigate, much less avert, the manifold effects of anthropogenic global warming,
has called into question the ‘origin’ as well as the ‘prehistory’ of eco-politics. The conspicuous
arche of eco-politics, which emerged between the 1960s–80s in North America and Europe258 as
a distinct, sui generis and recognizable form of politics, has become an ever-present origin that is
recurringly retrieved in the critical literature surrounding eco-politics.
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Retrieving this origin, A.D. Tarlock, for one, has argued that environmental politics
attained its “first peak of political power between 1968 and 1972 when it moved beyond the
progressive conservation vision to a more holistic theory of social and economic order,” thereby
marrying the “multi-level activism” of the civil rights and anti-war movements of the ‘60s with
environmental protection and conservation movements.259 Yet despite these political heights,
which arose in the wake of the “post-WWII spike in environmental degradation [that] gave rise
to new environmental needs and desires,” Melathopoulos and Stoner contend in Freedom in the
Anthropocene that “the environmental discontent expressed by contemporary environmentalism
[of the ‘60’s–70’s] failed to engender changes in social structure conducive to moving beyond
the societally induced environmental degradation which characterizes this period.”260 To be sure,
if environmental discontents (like any other form of discontent) are not reflexively non-identical
to the society it opposes and protests a ‘wrong’ against, these discontents are blunted and readily
integrated into society. In turn, such discontents become means of perpetuating the status quo of
an alienated social dynamic. Thus, the co-authors of Freedom in the Anthropocene insist:
“[e]nvironnmentalism remains identical with society while appearing opposed to it.”261 Indeed,
since the 1970s, environmental discontents—and eco-politics in the global north more broadly—
have become increasingly integrated into society via broad processes of institutionalization,
nationalism, environmental policy (“a system designed to manage and control rather than reduce
or restructure the sources of pollution and other environmental ills”), etc.262
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IV. Discontents with Eco-politics
7. From Outside: Critiques of the perceived ‘inefficacy’ of eco-politics can be found
across large swaths of scientific and sociological discourse from the past two decades. Consider,
a) Røpke (2005): “the ‘implementation deficit’ that followed the creation of national government
environmental agencies in the early 1970s in many OECD countries”; b) Blühdorn (2007) and
Steffen, et al. (2008): “the failure to guide economic development along the sustainable
development framework outlined by the Brundtland Report in 1987”; c) Blühdorn (2013) and
Karlsson (2013): “the sense of helplessness that attends the most recent turn to protest-oriented
climate justice.”263 From the standpoint of the retroactive present, the mass of these perceived
shortcomings and failures (among others) points to the runaway post-WWII dynamic of the
‘Great Acceleration,’ which delimits a period of intensified impact on the environment that leads
straight to the present. To be sure, this mediative society-environment dynamic continues
seemingly unabated, so long as forcible and dialectical opposition to capitalist society is
dormant.
From Inside: In an interview with Andony Melathopoulos, the American environmental
lawyer and advocate James Gustave Speth captures the contradiction between the evident growth
of environmental-isms and the overarching failure to satisfactorily redress the ecological crisis
via social transformation: “We now have a flourishing environmental movement, a proliferating
number of organisations, more and more money going into this, decades now of environmental
legislation and programs, at all levels of government, and the environment keeps going
downhill.”264 Further, as Melathopoulos provides running commentary, “[t]he contradiction,
according to Speth, results from the U.S. environmental movement focusing too narrowly on
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‘working within the system.’ They lobby, litigate and educate the public to the neglect of an
‘equally powerful effort to change the system itself.’”265

V. Narrativizing the Trajectory of Eco-politics
8. In many critical histories of environmental politics and movements, such as Robert
Gottlieb’s canonical Forcing the Spring (1993), little attention is paid to the extra-national and
geopolitical prehistory of eco-politics. The political imaginary of the “environmental humanities
in the United States” in particular, as Bob Nixon has noted, is especially “skewed toward nationbound scholarship that is at best tangentially international and, even then, seldom engages the
environmental fallout of U.S. foreign policy head on.”266 Beyond this imaginary, the generalhistorical prehistory of eco-politics we are asking after here, which flashes up in the face of
intensifying climate change, would doubtless seem, prima facie, discontinuous and extraneous to
the historical trajectory of environmental politics. Such a prehistory, for our purposes here,
would encompass the historico-political dynamics of progress/regression stemming from the
mid-19th century, which witnessed both the first ‘real subsumption’ of social life under capitalist
society as well as the agonistic emergence of a proletarian politics. These historical dynamics,
which further played out in the twentieth century on the world-historical stage and lead to the
present, constitute, for our purposes here, the a priori conflictual world out of and into which
eco-politics emerges. (From a Marxian purview, we should recall that “[t]he task of freedom in
the nineteenth century—that of consciously recognizing and actively transforming social
structure—was inextricably linked to the question of the political activity of the proletariat.”267)
Thus Benjamin’s image of origin as a “maelstrom [Strudel]” “in the flow of becoming” is
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instructive for grasping this complex emergence (Entstehen) of environmental politics
(Entstehen: (literally) “arising, in the sense of taking a stand, assuming a stance”).268
9. It has become common for critical histories of environmentalism to commence by
briefly remarking upon or confessing their object’s entropic posthistory; for example,
Christopher Rootes (1999): “It is an oversimplification to say that the environmental movement
has undergone a change from being a mass participatory movement to a series of institutionalised
interest groups.”269 Because the period of the ‘60s–80s stands as the conspicuous arche of
recognizable environmental politics in the global north, it seems appropriate that attempts to
broach the speculative revivification or reconstitution of such politics recurringly query whether
its “adaptations ultimately weaken the capacities of EMOs [environmental movements] to effect
the mass mobilisations from which the EMO’s power initially derived and upon which it may
ultimately depend.”270 Through the persistant retrieval of its origin, the critical literature
surrounding the trajectory and outcome of environmentalism points to the necessity for this
praxis to grasp its own historical emplotment.
In the essays composing Rootes’ edited collection, Environmental Movements, the only
trace of non- or extra-reformist iterations of eco-politics resides in the pseudo-tension Rootes
establishes between “[c]onventional and unconventional forms of action.”271 The latter is given
little-to-no voice, let alone ontological status, within this specific critical compendium on
environmental politics—but still nevertheless exists at its margins. Gottlieb, for one, has
addressed the problem of “defining contemporary environmentalism primarily in reference to its
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mainstream, institutional forms.”272 “Such historians,” Gottlieb continues, “cannot account for
the spontaneity and diversity of an environmentalism rooted in communities and constituencies
seeking to address issues of where and how people live, work [etc.]”—the latter which lie
outside of these former mainstream iterations.273 In the early case of the United Kingdom’s 1956
Clean Air Act (which predated the landmark U.S. 1970 Clean Air Act by more than ten years),
the extra-parliamentary pressure-group the National Smoke Abatement Society was a key force
in legislating the Act, which helped precipitate the U.K.’s creation of a national environmental
policy.

VI. Whence Eco-politics? (ii)
10. The ‘origin’ of environmental politics, which now appears as emerging within and
out of more general-historical configurations and fields of contestation that seem to delimit—or
at least pose problems for—its imputed possibilities for society-shaping, arises from the
posthistory274 of this sui generis form of politics, in other words, its outcome. Such a retroactive
relation between outcome and origin is given expression here by Rootes:
Of all the ‘new’ social movements which emerged from the student movements of the
late 1960s, it is environmental movements which have had most enduring influence on
politics and which have undergone the most wide-ranging institutionalisation in terms
both of the professionalisation of their activies and of the regularisation of their access to
policy-makers.275
As Rootes indicates here, the efficacy and survival of this specific post-‘60s iteration of
politics has been inseparable from its transmutation and accommodation via social forms of
institutionalization. In The Greening of a Nation (1998), Hal Rothman will echo this diagnosis in
272
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remarking how the environmental movement is paradoxically a “victim of its own successes.”276
As Rootes writes elsewhere, one result of such institutionalization has been that the
environmental movement no longer “capture[s] the imagination or command[s] the support of
any large part of the public.”277 Broad declines in public protests since the ‘70s have been seen
by some (Diani and Donati (1999)) as a key indicator of the public demobilization caused
by such adaptions.
11. It should be stressed that the general history in which eco-politics is tenuously being
placed and situated here is open to determination and contestation: ideally no privilege or
primacy should be accorded to any single discursive hermeneutic, historical trajectory, or voice
over another. Although it may be impossible to ever not occupy a standpoint, Adorno’s Negative
Dialectics nevertheless ventures to counterpose dialectics (or alternatively, dialectical critique) to
standpoint; thus Adorno’s maxim, “dialectics not a standpoint.”278 Against ‘standpoint,’ the
demos and its voicings of a ‘wrong’ not only haunt political community (contra the sensible
order of the police) but also haunt academic/discursive writing as a liminal non-identity
immanent to (policed) discursivity and discursive taboos, the former of which exceed these
enframings.
VII. The Anthropocene?
12. The recently-surfaced and -popularized concept of the Anthropocene has sought to
categorically inaugurate a new geological age wherein humanity is understood as the greatest
determinant of the global environment of the planet (e.g., its geology and ecosystems) following
the Industrial Revolution. Yet as Melathopoulos and Stoner have argued, the Anthropocene as an
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account of
what generates [socio-biophysical] change ends up linear [and such reified linearity ends
up] without the potential for being otherwise. This failure to specify the type of
transformation and its conditions of possibility ends up in the externalization of the
factors of transformation. Consequently, scholars have yet to specify the dynamic that is
generative of the current environment-society crisis.279
It is thus crucial to note the hallucinatory and thereby reified character of retroactively
projected origins such as the Anthropocene, which negatively capture how, rather than selfconsciously transforming the socio-biophysical world, humanity is subject to and dominated by
the history they have set in motion. To be sure, as Melathopoulos and Stoner contend, “it is
precisely history that appears to ensnare human society in a runaway developmental pattern that
will not lead to the opening of human capacities and the flourishing of ecosystems, but rather to
the inevitable diminishing of both.”280 In addition to its hypostatized linearity, the historicogeological concept also fails to directly address the political dimension of the ecological crisis
and the agonistic politics contained within the historical period it spans.
Despite its mystified character, it is important nevertheless to grasp ‘the Anthropocene’—
which currently has scientific, academic, artworld and popular traction—as expressing a
deepening and broadening of ecological subjectivity. Crutzen (2002) and Steffen, et al. (2011)
note that while “Anthropocene-like periodization” emerged as early as 1873, “it has only
recently become the subject of debate at international geological meetings and in the popular
media.”281 Yet, as Melathopoulos and Stoner argue, “[c]ut off from its historical and dialectical
genesis, the concept of the Anthropocene advanced by Crutzen, et al. is unable to effectively
grasp how a society that emerges from the Industrial Revolution can be both conscious of the
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degradation of planetary systems and seemingly powerless to do anything about it.”282 And yet,
the co-authors nevertheless maintain that “[a]ctual (critical) recognition of today’s worldwide
ecological crises would mean recognizing this thought itself as a form of reified consciousness,
so that the inherently irreducible, emancipatory potential contained within might be unleashed.”
Indeed, to acknowledge a thought as reified opens up the space for exploring how theory proper
might move beyond itself into a speculative relationship with praxis, so that the potency of
critical thought may come to fruition.283
13. As Chakrabarty observes, “the current [objective] crisis can precipitate a sense of the
present that disconnects the future from the past by putting such a future beyond the grasp of
historical sensibility.”284 (See, for instance, Alan Weisman’s best-selling book The World
Without Us (2007), which Chakrabarty singles out as exemplary of this tendency to abstract from
both the past and present and to fantasize the impending future.) Against this tendency,
Chakrabarty, a historian by training, asserts that “[t]he discipline of history exists on the
assumption that our past, present, and future are connected by a certain continuity of human
experience.”285 In Freedom in the Anthropocene, Melathopoulos and Stoner similarly assert the
necessity of immanence to both the past (history) and the present, i.e., our contemporary
juncture. Despite the fact that, “[t]oday, society threatens to transform planetary systems in a
manner that surpasses the reach of geological processes of much larger timescales,” the coauthors argue (paraphrasing Rosa Luxemburg) that the “prime political task at this stage in the
Great Acceleration is being able to learn again, by learning the lessons of relating theory and
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practice in history.”286

VIII. “Death of Environmentalism”?
14. Ingolfur Blühdorn’s concept of “post-ecologist politics” which attempts to articulate
the contemporary post-‘90s narrative emplotment of environmental politics also expresses a
desire to rethink and reconstitute eco-politics “since the late 1980s” via immanent critique.287 In
so doing, Blühdorn’s work directly remarks upon the posthistory of eco-politics, which for him is
marked by the exhaustion of an “ecologist critique of modernity and the ecologist belief in a
comprehensively different society,” both of which have stymied eco-politics’ capacity for
society-shaping praxis. 288
Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ Death of Environmentalism (2004) similarly points to such
an exhaustion with their sweeping call to “reexamine everything we think we know about global
warming and environmental politics.”289 Interrogating the outcome of such politics, the coauthors ominously query: “has the U.S. environmental community’s work over the past 30 years
laid the groundwork for the economic, cultural and political shifts that we know will be
necessary to deal with the crisis?”290 However, in the specific case of the authors of Death of
Environmentalism their emphasis is still on solutions, albeit revamped ones (see their Break
Through (2007)), that look to the state and “increasingly sophisticated technical solutions to
climate change” (see, for example, the controversial Solar-Radiation Management (SRM)
technologies) to bring about an “ecological revolution.”291 In these appeals to the state and
techno-scientific reason, we should note the attitude of passivity and the temporality of
286
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expectancy that accompanies such recognitive gestures. These gestures index, more generally,
the “inability of society to freely regulate itself” and transform itself in the direction and at the
service of social freedom.292
15. As many critical histories of environmentalism capture, such as the classic Forcing
the Spring, the early period of environmental politics and movements in the ‘60s–70s in North
America and Europe focused on a wide array of problems (many inherited from the anterior antinuclear movement, among others), for instance, ranging from managing “the quality of air, water
and soil” to “protecting flora and fauna.”293 However, in contemporary discourse surrounding
environmentalism in our early 21st century moment, there is detectable a new sense of focus,
temporal urgency and discursive intensification, given that global warming is now generally
understood to pose “the greatest challenge” for eco-politics. 294 This new ascribed primacy of
climate change, however, has not canceled out the manifold of other ecological problems
engendered by the society-environment problematic but has only intensified them, e.g., loss of
biodiversity, resource scarcity, pollution, etc.
16. Given recurrent reports and declarations of the death of environmentalism, it is
tempting to read a ‘death drive’ out of the body of literature comprising critical histories of ecopolitics written, say, within the last 30 years beginning with Gottlieb’s seminal Forcing the
Spring. These works seek to bring to cessation (via critique) and hence inaugurate an ‘end’ of
their object; e.g., Shellenberger and Nordhaus: “modern environmentalism…must die so that
something new can live.”295 These summary ends, we should note, operate on a more
fundamental disagreement vis-à-vis the theory and praxis of hitherto eco-politics, and thereby
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create a critical fissure in the normative regimes of sense and sense-making surrounding what is
called environmental politics.
Beyond such dissensus, critical histories of eco-politics often conclude with the upshot of
inaugurating some new beginning. Yet this Arendtian-like arche tends to take on a confused and
opaque form; often not being clearly articulated or only tentatively put forth, such as in the final
chapter of Haq and Paul’s Environmentalism Since 1945: “The Future of Environmentalism.”296
More common, however, is for these works to opt for hope, expectancy, futural projection and
the like,297 rather than dialectically engaging and critiquing actually-existing environmental
politics and the antinomies it expresses in theory and praxis. Nevertheless, in terms of their
positive, manifest-content, these critical histories express what might be called an anarcho-realist
maxim: they demand for a more real, more authentic, more socially-engaged, more democratic,
(etc.) form of environmentalism to emerge in order to overcome its perceived inefficacy and/or
history of failures.

IX. Antinomies of Environmental Politics
17. The afterlife of the environmental politics and movements that emerged alongside
and out of the ‘60s-70s New Left in the global north298 has resulted in the antinomy (among
others299) between, on the one hand, forms of eco-anarchism that are protest-driven and
undertake other such forms of resistance; and, on the other hand, reformist iterations of so-called
market environmentalism that engage with the state and within mainstream politics to mitigate
296
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the ongoing environmental crisis.300 This antinomy can be conjured, for instance, via the
disjunction—and the great dissonance that obtains therein—between the 2015 Paris Climate
Conference and the 2016 protests currently being carried out by indigenous First Nations tribes
surrounding the North Dakota pipeline. To be sure, both of these struggles and actions seem
equally necessary, vital, and important, but take place, as it were, in different, noncommunicating realms of praxis and theory. As John Hannigan has noted, “environmental
debates reflect the existence not just of an absence of certainty…but rather the existence of
contradictory certainties.”301
Taken individually or as an unlikely aggregate, these antithetical poles of eco-politics302
appear unable to bring about the thoroughgoing social transformation that both assert is
necessary in order to cope with, much less avert, ongoing and future climate change. Indeed, the
so-called “ecological revolution” called for by reformist market-environmentalism is in many
ways comparable to the thoroughgoing society-shaping demanded by contemporary ecoanarchist discourse, albeit the latter is typically thought to be achieved via forms of direct action.
Addressing this antinomy between “alternative groups” of eco-politics and “mainstream
environmentalism,” Gottlieb will query in Forcing the Spring whether “mainstream and
alternative groups [can] find a common language, a shared history, a common conceptual and
organizational home?”303
18. These irreconcilable extremes can here be placed within a broader history of the Left,
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and more specifically, in relation to the problematics that also beset the New Left304 (and here we
echo one recent trend in academic leftist discourse305). Such antinomies can be addressed,
however circuitously, through an immanent and historical metacritique of Theodor Adorno’s
corpus, which both anticipates and directly engages theoretical and practical obstacles that not
only predated the historical emergence of the New Left but were also countenanced by this
protean iteration of the Left in real, historical time. Yet for this ostensibly more general history
of the Left (encompassing, for our purposes here, eco-politics) to attain to its concept, it would
need to open itself up to voices and traditions that, historically, have been authoritarianly muted
or repressed by the institutional forms of the Left. These are voices that still exist at the margins
of the dominant ‘left’ discourses and institutions as, quite literally, noise emitted from subaltern
mouths.

X. What Is Eco-anarchism?
19. Eco-anarchism was first classically conceptualized by Murray Bookchin in the early
‘60’s following his break with Trotskyism and Marxism more generally, an arc that resembles
304
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that of Cornelius Castoriadis’ own break from Trotskyism/Marxism and subsequent embrace of
council-communism. In the essay “Ecology and Revolutionary Thought” (1964), Bookchin
introduced the concept of ecology into radical politics. Rooted in his critiques of hierarchical
societies that are predicated on the domination of (wo)man by man, eco-anarchism operates on
the basis of a horizontal democratic confederationalism or libertarian municipalism. Both of the
latter are comparable to the council-communism in vogue during the ‘60s-70s New Left, a period
of the Left that witnessed the further cleaving of (neo-)anarchism from Marxism: a turn
motivated by discontents of anti-authoritarianism and anti-Stalinism.
20. We should note here that contemporary eco-anarchism and neo-anarchism more
generally, both of which are forms of praxis that construct a rhetoric out of resistance, have
acquired a new aura and signification in the wake of the 1999 anti-globalization Seattle protests.
This event inaugurated what some have defined as our post-political activist-driven culture,
which has given birth to what Liza Featherstone, et al. have termed “activist-ism,” a term that
explicitly echoes Adorno’s late concept of “actionism.”306 What is captured by these critical
concepts is a form of subjectivity and social practice that, in expressing an extreme, runs the risk
of failing to apprehend its own unthoughts and categorical theoretico-practical others. Such a
critique of neo-anarchism is levelled by Moishe Postone, who has written of post-‘60s New Left
“resistance” as “fail[ing] to grasp its own conditions of possibility”:
[After the late-‘60s] [t]he idea of a fundamental transformation became bracketed and,
instead, was replaced by the more ambiguous notion of resistance. The notion of
resistance, however, says little about the nature of that which is being resisted or of the
politics of the resistance involved…[Resistance] is rarely based on a reflexive analysis of
possibilities for fundamental change that are both generated and suppressed by the
dynamic heteronomous order. [Resistance] is an undialectical category that does not
grasp its own conditions of possibility; that is, it fails to grasp the dynamic historical
context of which it is a part.307
306
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Postone’s gross but provocative critique of resistance here raises the question of what
dialectical resistance might look like, i.e., resistance that does in fact grasp its own conditions of
possibility.
Yet anarchism and more generally, nonconceptuality, spontaneity, and praxis born of
immediacy and contingency, tend to be blind spots (and thus phantasms) for ‘major’ discourses
and epistemes, constituting not only the latter’s subaltern others but also perhaps their
(repressed) conditions of possibility, much like the big toe or the gaping exposure of the human
eye for Bataille. Consider, for instance, the historically fraught relationship between Marxism
and anarchism, in which anarchism tends to constitute the former’s banished and repressed other.
Classically, this tension crystallized in the infamous quarrel between Marx and Bakunin
surrounding the First International of 1864 and was borne out in the broad dismissal of the figure
of Blanqui in Marxian thought,308 whom Benjamin sought to recover in his Arcades Project.

XI. Disagreement: Eco-Anarchism and Environmental Reformism
21. The tension between anarchist and reformist/mainstream environmental politics,
much

like

the

disjunctions

between

academic/extra-academic,

Marxism/anarchism,

theory/praxis, etc.—many of which appear to have arisen or have roots in the ‘60s-70s, but
whose prehistories no doubt run much deeper309—can be regarded, to paraphrase Adorno, as two
308
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torn halves of an “integral freedom” which, however, do not add up to a whole.310 In other
words, both sides are moments or ingredients of a dialectic that would place both terms into a
mutually-constitutive dynamic. Put in the phraseology of Walter Benjamin’s “dialectics of
intoxication”: it would take “the energies of intoxication”—“a praxis oscillating between fitness
exercises and celebration in advance”—and the “constructive, dictatorial side of revolution”
(“methodical and disciplinary preparation”) for the integral whole of theory and praxis to be put
back together, such that, as Benjamin writes, “reality [has] transcended itself to the extent
demanded by the Communist Manifesto.”311 For our purposes, perhaps as Benjamin suggests it is
only through such a dialectics that combines the rational-processual (typified here by reformist
market-environmentalism) with messianic immanence (seen in forms of eco-anarchism and
resistance) that the dynamic exchange between theory and praxis could be reconstituted as a
‘whole.’ Following Adorno and to a certain extent the pragmatism of Dewey, critical social
theory must risk tendentially mediating the enduring and unresolved antinomies of social praxis
(without, however, resolving such antinomies) in order to open up speculative possibilities for
praxis’ own self-overcoming—a capacity for reflection praxis can hardly afford.

XII. Idea as Constellation of Extremes
22. In the Trauerspiel, Benjamin puts forth an understanding of the idea as a constellation
of extremes. This thought-figure which suspends philosophical integrative mediation is
methodologically taken up by Adorno who defines the “idea of truth” in Negative Dialectics as
the “touch[ing]” of “two extremes.”312 While truth, or perhaps more crucially for Adorno, social
truth, lies “in and through the extremes, in the extremes themselves,” “[t]he two [extremes]
310
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cannot,” however, “be glued together in a synthesis.”313 As Adorno relates in an off-hand manner
in his Lectures on Negative Dialectics, “I was someone who tended to extremes, who detected
something false in syncretism and who instinctively objected to happy mediums, following
Arnold Schoenberg, who had written that the middle road is the only one that does not lead to
Rome.”314 As we explored in chapters 1–3, the veritable resources for reconciling praxis and a
possible reconciled life lie precisely in these extremes or antinomies for Adorno: “What has not
been severed lives solely in the extremes.”315 Thus, “[t]he only thoughts to have a chance are
those that go to extremes, capable of cerebral acrobatics.”316

XIII. Method: Natural History
the negativity of natural history—which always discovers what phenomena used to be,
what they have become and, at the same time, what they might have been retains the
possible life of phenomena as opposed to their actual existence.—Adorno317
23. Through relating its prehistory to its posthistory, the natural history of environmental
politics—more precisely, the natural history of the problem-idea of environmental politics—can
be “virtually explored” and “assembled,” one which exposes a logic of decay and devolution.318
Indeed the “allegorical vision” that opens up natural history, in which Benjamin immerses and
absorbs himself in the Trauerspiel; the “vision” whose sidelong, melancholic gaze strips
historical phenomena of cultural and ontotheological accretions, bestows upon them in the
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latter’s stead a “natural life” (natürliches Leben) with their own singular natural history.319 This
vision also opens up, for our purposes here, the space-time for Benjamin’s “thanatological model
of interpretation,” whereby critique intensifies and assists in the natural-historical mortification
of works, which illuminates the ‘truth content’ of a work through the burning up of its material
content and results in the work’s collapse.320 Yet as Deleuze reminds us, “Problems-Ideas are
positive multiplicities, full and differentiated positivities described by the process of complete
and reciprocal determination which relates problems to their conditions.”321 Thus “[t]he
positivity of problems”—whence springs affirmation, decision, etc.—“is constituted by the fact
of being ‘posited.’”322
Indeed, by bringing into constellation the remote extremes of its development (pre- and
post-history)—as critical histories of eco-politics normatively do, that is, critiques that (however
unconsciously)

explore

the

conditions

of

im/possibility

for

the theoretico-practical

transformation of such politics—‘environmental politics’ can be grasped and critiqued
immanently in the direction of its potential self-comprehension. A natural history of
environmental politics would thus occasion the problem-question of the appropriate selftransformation (being for-itself) of such politics and thereby subsequently broach its in/capacity
for social transformation (being in-itself). Natural history thus, while “virtual” in its
philosophico-historical form of presentation, nevertheless opens up the space for working
319
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through reified forms of (self-)appearance which, as necessary and psychically-real phantasms,
bar the necessary (self-)recuperation that is the condition of possibility for self-determination and
self-legislation on the models of the psyche and that of collective praxis.323 Yet a natural
history—which Benjamin argues requires “protection in order to unfold clearly and
[unperturbed] by human life”—amounts to little more than a critical historiographic poetics that
crystallizes into a constellation the pre- and post-history of a phenomenon.324 Indeed, as
Benjamin reveals, when such a history is constructed and finally attains “rest,” such
“philosophical history” (which he defines as “the science of the origin”) becomes “naturalhistorical” in a ‘vulgar,’ “inauthentic” sense: becoming is translated into being and thereby
attains the presence of still-life.325 Philosophical history, the form of research and presentation
this thesis undertakes, hence cannot take comfort in its own idea, and must remark upon its own
ipseity in the face of its categorical antithesis, praxis. At the same time, however, such an antihistoriographic poetics must also strive to reestablish the historically-liquidated “umbilical cord”
between theory and praxis; in our case here: explore (minimal) conditions of im/possibility for
their tentative rapprochement.326

XIV. What Does Climate Change?
24. Calls from environmentalists for “systemic changes,” the “transformation of society,”
an “ecological revolution,” and so on, in order to avert or cope with ongoing and future climate
change and its attendant ecological extirpations, have increasingly displaced its former privative
language of protection (e.g., biodiversity), reduction (e.g., emissions), mitigation (e.g.,
323
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degradation), etc.327 These intensifying demands, however, appear at odds with the trajectory of
the eco-politics and -movements issuing from the ‘60s and ‘70s in the global north, which have
witnessed “wide-ranging institutionalization” and have resulted in the above reformism/
resistance antinomy, among others.328 Further, the transference and projection of leftist demands
onto eco-politics—seen for instance in the critical reception of the high-profile environmentalist
and writer Naomi Klein’s This Changes Everything (2014)329—have raised the stakes for
environmental politics in general and, moreover, have retroactively rendered past and present
forms of such politics apparently inadequate. Indeed, the critical reception and broad popularity
of Klein’s book have served as indicators of both the increased awareness of the preponderance
of anthropogenic global warming as well as the increasingly high demands made upon ecopolitics. Epithets such as ‘market environmentalism’ and ‘green capitalism’ call into question, by
their very names, a specific and potentially limited political approach to reckoning with the
environmental crisis that looks to the state and reformist measures to address this enduring
problem. As Klein has succinctly put it, “there are no non-radical options left before us.”330 Thus
eco-politics faces “the same theoretical problem that socialism [i.e., the traditional Left]
confronted much earlier as to whether it is a revolutionary or reformist ideology.”331 We should
note here, however, that the topical antinomy we have thematized heretofore does not obtain
between reform or revolution but rather between reformism or resistance, despite the fact that
eco-anarchism and market environmentalism both acknowledge the necessity of some radical
327
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othering of society.
25. With This Changes Everything, Naomi Klein has emerged as a central figure in
contemporary discourse surrounding environmental politics: one who is not reducible to our two
above typologies of environmentalism and who has, moreover, sought to move beyond this
either/or altogether. On the registers of her thought and temperament, we should note how Klein
exhibits a certain compatibility between these two theoretico-practical orientations. Indeed, in
terms of her reception, Klein has been celebrated by both neo-anarchists (see her No Logo
(1999)) and also more mainstream, left-identifying liberals. This Changes Everything documents
Klein’s own break with market environmentalism as an approach to addressing global warming
and finds her rethinking how to best approach the problem. Seeing capitalist society as the
fundamental stumbling block to tackling climate change (the subtitle of her book: “Capitalism
vs. The Climate”), Klein has argued that nothing less than a “profound and radical economic
transformation” will be able to avert the onset crisis.332 Yet Klein is wary of both local, “activist”
approaches to bringing about such a transformation (that are “performed by a small tribe within a
culture”) as well as reformist approaches that look to the “political class” (i.e., the managerial
political elite), whom she criticizes as “wholly incapable of seizing those tools and implementing
those plans [to redress the crisis], since doing so involves unlearning the core tenets of the
stifling free-market ideology that governed every stage of their rise to power.”333
Klein’s historico-political horizon, however, is ultimately that of the ‘60s-70s New Left
and its irreducible concept of a ‘movement’ onto which her optimism and hopes for the future
are inextricably cathected. In the final chapter of This Changes Everything she turns to the
history of social movements and notes how in the civil rights movement, for instance, “the usual
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categories dividing ‘activists’ and ‘regular people’” “became meaningless because the project of
changing society was so deeply woven into the project of life. Activists were, quite simply,
everyone.”334 While Klein sees such inclusivity as desirable, she insists that she is not calling for
a “new movement that will magically succeed where others failed.”335 Instead, she seeks to
understand how, like certain past social movements, “climate change can be the force—the grand
push—that will bring together all of [the] still living movements.”336
26. As has been argued by Richard Rubin (2009), the concept of a movement stands as
something of a regulative idea for “the dominant conception of politics on the [post-New Left]
Left.”337 Indeed, this normative understanding of a movement, which is wedded to the politics of
the New Left, grasps its “goal,” Rubin writes, as putting “pressure on the government to do
something or to not do something,” which—while not a bad or wrong-headed pursuit in and of
itself—tends to bracket “the possibility that the global environment in which movements operate
could itself ever be radically changed.”338 To be sure, Rubin continues, “[w]e will have
movements against bad things, such as war, poverty, [etc.], but we are going to keep fighting
essentially the same struggles under different conditions, sometimes better and sometimes
worse.”339 What should be underlined here is that the horizon of a movement—Rubin goes on—
is a “profoundly pessimistic conception for the Left to have, and it is not the one it always had.
At one time the Left had a much more triumphal conception of its own capacity to build a
radically new world.”340 In other words, “a conception of politics centered on movements [or
even, for that matter, a ‘movement of movements’ pace Klein] is one that has already taken a
334
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huge amount of defeat and pessimism for granted.”341 Rubin here articulates one unthought of
post-New Left politics, within which our contemporary post-political moment is contained.

XV. Conclusion: Environmental Politics and the History of the Left, a Preliminary Reencounter
27. Many of the theoretical and practical impasses environmental politics faces appear to
predate its own historical emergence when placed into a more general economy of history, one
which reaches farther back than the ever-lingering narrative emplotment of the ‘60s-70s New
Left. More precisely, these problems can be understood as reiterations of ‘past’ problems in
theory and praxis which various forms of the Left once countenanced in real, historical time but
perhaps never properly worked through; problems that may consequently still persist,
undigested, in the present. Yet while the theoretical and practical challenges faced by ecopolitics may have precedents in the history of the Left, or may be bound up with past leftist
problems yet to be liquidated, the former are nevertheless unprecedented and must be addressed
in their novelty and singularity given our historical juncture. In light of the above discontents
with eco-politics, the appeal of grafting eco-politics and -movements onto a more general (but
perhaps more dogmatic and authoritarian) history of the Left is that the perceived inefficacies
and failures of eco-politics are accounted for and explained away by means of the reassertion of
a historical master-narrative of the Left; and typically a homogenizing narrative that casts the
Left with an inborn openness to degenerate.
28. Such a tack is taken in a recent work of great ambition and massive scope, which we
have cited extensively heretofore, Freedom in the Anthropocene: 20th Century Helplessness in
the Face of Climate Change. In this work the trajectory and problematics of environmental
341
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politics are indeed grafted onto a broader and encompassing history of the Left. Co-authors
Melathopoulos and Stoner argue that working through the failed world-revolutionary politics of
the Left in the early twentieth century (to be precise, from 1914–1923, ending with the “decisive
defeat of communist uprisings in Germany, Italy, and Hungary”342) can help us come to grips
with why contemporary eco-politics seems unable to effectuate satisfactory social transformation
in the present. More broadly, these failures of the Left are also understood by the authors as
setting the geopolitical stage for the unchecked post-WWII dynamic of the Great Acceleration.343
The chief merit of Freedom in the Anthropocene lies in its heeding Chakrabarty’s call to
explain
this catastrophe [the Anthropocene]…[via] a conversation between disciplines and
between recorded and deep histories of human beings in the same way that the
agricultural revolution of ten thousand years ago could not be explained except through a
convergence of three disciplines: geology, archaeology, and history.344
In other words, heeding the call for radical interdisciplinarity in the face of the hyperobject of global warming. Yet even further, Freedom in the Anthropocene queries the politics of
the Anthropocene by integrating the political and tendential purview of Marxism with geological
“deep histories” of the trajectory that the Anthropocene retroactively indexes.345 Despite our
present ability to construct deep histories, Chakrabarty reminds us that “[i]n no discussion of
freedom in the period since the Enlightenment was there ever any awareness of the geological
agency that human beings were acquiring at the same time as and through processes closely
linked to their acquisition of freedom.”346 To be sure, without the insertion of the immanent
streams of agonistic politics and the modern pursuit of freedom, the Anthropocene stands as a
342
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mere historical category. Describing past history that we do not identify with, geological spacetime and the trajectory of human history—wherein the modern pursuit of freedom arises—stand
unmediated. Ultimately, Freedom in the Anthropocene succeeds in constellating two histories:
the history of emancipatory politics as culminating in Marxism as a politics, and the deep
geologico-ecological history of the Anthropocene. However, Freedom in the Anthropocene has
by and large neglected examining the antinomies animating environmental politics as nonidentical from those bequeathed by the history of the Left, a task we have undertaken here.
29. The twin pitfalls with regard to constellating the history of the Left and
environmental politics are, on the one hand, to reduce one history to the other (i.e., one trajectory
becomes a master-narrative); and, on the other hand, to treat them as distinct trajectories that
exist in parallel universes (that have no bearing on one another). Heuristically, eco-politics is
here presented as non-identical to the history of the Left so as to retain both of their respective
trajectories and messianisms; yet, as I have advanced heretofore, it may be productive to regard
this former historical trajectory as being entangled with the latter trajectory, if we are to
adequately reckon with the former’s discontents. The reification of these two historical
trajectories as categorically distinct thus opens up the possibility to virtually rearrange them into
a new constellation via the critical model of allegory. Moreover, the purpose of speculatively
mediating the two is to reveal how an apparently one-sided standpoint may have purchase
beyond its own ipseity.
30. Not only does Freedom in the Anthropocene posit a certain authoritative and selfidentical understanding of the history of the Left, but the co-authors’ tendencies to regard this
specific trajectory as if it were the hidden truth of history347 risks succumbing to age-old
hermeneutical trappings of leftist dogmatism. Like the religious spirit that sees God in
347
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everything, such a left-centric view of history—that addresses each emergent phenomenon as
being overdetermined by the past348—risks becoming a non-negotiable stance that closes off
availability to both the present and future (and perhaps a different past) by fixating the ‘failed’
past, despite its avowedly good-cum-revolutionary intentions. (Trotsky and Trotskyism’s
cathexis of 1917 would be a prime example of such an intransigent left-hermeneutics.) Such a
model of interpretation resembles Freudian psychoanalysis insofar as every moment of crisis
spells reemergence: each new crisis represents the ongoing failure to solve a past (psychic,
social, etc.) conflict that was never adequately attended to and/or resolved. (This particular
understanding of sedimented crisis is articulated in Adorno’s formulation, “the new…remains
the old in distress, in its hour of need.”349) Worse, it can border on becoming a jargon of
authenticity that belittles forgetfulness and authoritarianly declares an originary arche to which
all thinking and praxis must claim fidelity.
The above leftist hermeneutical trappings lie less in the Zizekian-Badiouian variety of
Stalinophilic decisionism and more in an overidentification with Adorno’s cul-de-sac. In
embracing Adorno’s ambivalences and antinomies, Freedom in the Anthropocene ultimately
hypostatizes the historico-philosophical significance of Adorno and remains within the trap of
compulsive historical retrieval, castigating all political forms born of immediacy and resistance
as ‘New Leftism’ or undialectical anarchism. In other words, while Freedom in the
Anthropocene effectively broaches the matter of Adorno’s historico-philosophical significance
and explores the enduring antinomies that his corpus registers, the work is unable,
notwithstanding, to overcome Adorno’s cul-de-sac, which is doubtless another matter altogether.
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To be sure, overcoming Adorno’s cul-de-sac would first necessitate an acknowledgment of the
ways in which our historical juncture is discontinuous with Adorno’s and, secondly, an
acknowledgement that a minimum amount of experimentation, that is, present and futural
(psychic) availability, is required in order to simultaneously move beyond this dead-end and all
the while preserve the insights of Adorno. As we have sought to explicate in this chapter, such
experimentation could come through thematizing the contemporary antinomies of environmental
politics; or, perhaps in a different register, by addressing the antinomic ambivalences that are
expressed in and through contemporary ecological subjectivity.
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